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There are over two thousand years of experience to tell us that the only thing harder than get-
ting a new idea into the military mind is to get an old one out. 
 
Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart, Thoughts on War, 1943
1
 
                                                 
1
 Liddell Hart 1943:115 
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Summary 
The aim of this thesis is to examine and discuss the historical and current pretexts of to what 
degree the United States is rebalancing toward Asia, and to discuss what implications it has for 
Europe. The aim is reached by analyzing a selected portion of political and military declaratory 
policies and implemented actions 1945 to 2014 by the President of The United States. Based on 
the findings, the thesis ends with the discussion of the implications it has for Europe           
 
The theoretical idea used is based on previous studies that analyzed declaratory polices and 
planned actions/operational policies. As previous scholars have focused on exploring differences 
between the declaratory policies and planned actions or on explaining the outcome of different 
levels actions within the administrations, a new model was developed analyzing the attention 
given by the same level within the administration. By using a mixed method of statistical and 
qualitative data, the attention could be measured and the degree of rebalancing concluded.  
 
During the time period studied, The United States has always paid attention to the Pacific Com-
mand. Within the declaratory polices studied, no degree of rebalancing toward the Pacific Com-
mand can be identified but within the implemented actions studied the degree of rebalancing was 
high from 1985 to 2005, and today just maintained. The conclusions are marred with the demar-
cations made of only analyzing one actor within the political and military field. This method is 
possibly the wrong way of addressing the debate of rebalancing and what it really means—
whether it is from the political and/or military fields to other power systems such as the econom-
ic or technical. Or is it a type of war fatigue that occurs approximately every 20 years? If ad-
dressed, the implications for Europe could be argued to be positive.      
 
The outcome of the study can be used within the general debate of the United States’ attention 
regarding the political and military power systems.  However,  it cannot be generalized to other 
power systems or other nations, except to possibly explain the behaviors of other nations, both 
friendly and potential adversaries. Regarding the method developed for this study, the results 
indicate that it can be of general use in further studies within this academic field, both in regard 
to the theoretical approach and in the usage of a mixed method with emphasis on statistical data. 
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Abstract 
The aim of this thesis is to examine and discuss the historical and current pretexts of to what 
degree the United States is rebalancing toward Asia and to discuss which implications it has for 
Europe. The aim is reached by analyzing a selected portion of political and military declaratory 
policies and implemented actions from 1945 to 2014 by the President of The United States.  
 
The analysis is based on a self-developed theoretical idea and uses a mixed method that uses 
mainly statistical data with added qualitative data, comments and remarks. It is divided into four 
main parts, first with an introduction where the methodological approach is developed, followed 
by the analysis of the declaratory policy and the implemented actions, and ending with conclu-
sion of the findings and a discussion of which implications it has for Europe.  
 
The results vary from no degree of rebalancing within the declaratory polices to a high degree of 
rebalancing between 1985 and 2005 and then to only a very low degree of rebalancing, if any, 
since 2011. The European Command has received consistently less attention over time. The im-
plications for Europe can in fact be in favor of European security if addressed properly.         
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1 Introduction 
1.1 General introduction and research questions 
The aim of this thesis is to examine and discuss the historical and current pretexts of to what 
degree the United States is rebalancing toward Asia, and to discuss which implications it has for 
Europe. It is reached by analyzing a selected portion of the United States’ statements, visions 
and implemented actions 1945 to 2014 in order to establish when, to what degree and whether a 
rebalancing occurred. The thesis ends with a discussion of what implications the findings do 
have for Europe. 
 
The debate or perception regarding the United States focusing less on Europe is not new,
2
 but it 
gained momentum and restarted in October 2011. Former United States Secretary of State Hilla-
ry Clinton published the article “America’s Pacific Century” in Foreign Policy and shortly there-
after held a speech in Honolulu, Hawaii where she used the wording pivot point.
3
 Just a few 
weeks later, the debate gained more momentum as President Barack Obama addressed the Aus-
tralian parliament and stressed the future American focus on Asia.
4
 The official American state-
ments were politically debated (including in Norway), debated within academic societies (for 
example by Kjell Engelbrekt, Zhu Feng, Gideon Rachman, James Steinberg, Stephen Szabo, 
Øystein Tunsjø), written about in mass media, and widely discussed that the American rebalanc-
ing will be at the expense of American presence in Europe.
5
 A possible effect of the initial de-
bate in 2011 and 2012, including the Chinese-stated sense of intimidation,
6
 was in the following 
release of the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance
7
 and as the U.S. National Security Advisor Tom 
Donilon in 2013
8
 used the wording rebalancing toward Asia instead of pivot point. The recent 
                                                 
2
 Fabius 2014; Hallams & Schreer 2012 
3
 Clinton 2011a; Clinton 2011b 
4
 Obama 2011 
5
 Eriksen Söreide 2014 b; Engelbrekt  2013; Feng  2012; Rachman 2013; Steinberg et. al. 2012; Szabo 2012; Tunsjö 
2013 and media i.e. Horn 2012 
6
 Nathan & Scobell 2012; Zhong 2012. Regarding Zhong, see Bibliography for extended comment.   
7
 Department of Defense 2012c: 2  
8
 Donilon 2013 
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pivot or rebalancing has been described in more specific detail in political objectives by the 
United States State Department as well as in military terms by the United States Secretary of 
Defense. The political objectives have been described as modernizing and strengthening U.S. 
alliances by interacting with new and existing partners, supporting regional institutions, increas-
ing trade and investments, ensuring military presence, promoting democratic development, good 
governance and human rights and lastly, developing the relations between the regions’ people.9 
The military description includes redeployment of troops from Okinawa, Japan to Guam (an is-
land in the Pacific, defined as United State territory), the rotation of up to 2.500 marines to Aus-
tralia, maintenance of a substantial presence in South Korea and an increased presence in the 
area by the U.S. Navy. This Navy presence will increase the focus in the region by basing 60 
percent of the ships compared to today’s 50/50 split between the Atlantic and the Pacific.10 More 
recently, the Secretary of Defense addressed the rebalancing in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense 
Review.
11
 
 
 
But is it really so that the United States is rebalancing to Asia and reducing its presence in Eu-
rope in favor of Asia? If it is, is it a negative thing? If present, is the rebalancing a trend over a 
long period or has it just begun? If there is no rebalancing to be found, is the debate restarted in 
2011 a result of the United States sending mixed messages by declaring one thing but doing 
something else in practice? Such a phenomenon, that declaratory policy is or is not in agreement 
with operational policies, was already addressed by Paul Nitze in 1956
12
 and more recently by 
Mats Berdal,
13
 whose theoretical framework has inspired the methodological approach in this 
thesis. But what if the declaratory and operational policies are in agreement? Has the ongoing 
crisis in Ukraine taken the spotlight away from not only the debate but also the possible effort of 
a rebalancing, this is if it were present?  
 
                                                 
9
 Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs 2013  
10
 Panetta 2012; The Guardian 2013 
11
 Department of Defense 2014: V   
12
 Nitze 1956  
13
 Berdal 1997 
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These questions triggered this study. The aim of this thesis is to investigate to what degree the 
United States is rebalancing toward Asia, and to discuss which implications it has for Europe. 
The aim addresses two items: first, it asks if a United States rebalancing toward Asia can be 
identified and if so, to what degree; second, which implications do the findings of the first part of 
the question have for Europe.   
 
In order to make it fulfill the aim, three research questions have been formulated and will be ana-
lyzed:   
1) Which patterns or trends can be identified within the United States declaratory policies 
to support a rebalancing toward Asia? 
2) Which patterns or trends can be identified within the United States implemented actions 
to support a rebalancing toward Asia? 
3) In what way can European security be affected by a potential United States rebalancing 
toward Asia? 
 
Before presenting the research design, a short discussion will follow addressing previous re-
search within this academic field, the theoretical framework and method used in this thesis. It 
will then end by addressing the way in which this thesis contributes to both the general debate 
and the debate within academic societies. 
  
1.2 Research survey, method and originality   
It is widely known that geopolitics is an important driver for the United States security policy. 
The relevance and continued importance of the historical debate regarding geopolitics (including 
Eurasia) since the Cold War until the present for the United States has been described in former 
National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski’s The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy 
and Its Geostrategic Imperatives. In this book, Brzezinski describes the national security objec-
tive of the United States as being to dominate or hinder other nations from dominating the Eura-
sian landmass and by that explaining the need for the continued attention of the United States to 
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be within the whole of Eurasia.
14
 Geopolitics was well debated before the Second World War, 
starting in 1899 by the Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellen, and regained momentum in the 
1970s as the National Security Advisor and later Secretary of State Henry Kissinger introduced 
the synonym balance-of-power politics to describe the contest of controlling global resource 
between the two superpowers: the Soviet Union and the United States.
15
 Eurasia, a word intro-
duced by Halford J. Mackinder in 1904 for the landmass containing Europe and Asia, describes 
the world’s political pivot area, presented in Figure A.16 The importance of the Eurasia area has 
been discussed by several historical geopolitical writers in addition to Mackinder, such as Theo-
dore Roosevelt and Karl Haushofer, if further reading is desired.
17
   
 
 
Figure A: The natural seas of power, Mackinder 1904
18 
 
                                                 
14
 Brzezinski 1997 
15
 Tuathail 2006: 1-5 
16
 Mackinder 2006: 34-39    
17
 Roosevelt 2006: 39; Haushofer 2006: 40-42 
18
 Mackinder 2006: 38 
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The debate of geopolitics and the Eurasia-continent is of importance to have in mind when dis-
cussing the United States attention given to different geographical areas as well as thematic top-
ics out of two main reasons. First; as described, the United States looks at the Eurasia-continent 
as one entity and not as two or three different, for instance Europe, Asia and the Middle East, 
when formulating the politics trying to achieve the national objective. That could mean that dif-
ferent tools are used in different areas for achieving the overall objective. In the end such conclu-
sion also means having a discussion putting Europe against Asia from a United States perspec-
tive could be difficult as it is not a question of either or, rather the opposite, both at the same 
time. This will be touched upon within this thesis. Second, as the United States view Eurasia as 
one entity, actions done by the United States in one part or the area, for instance the United 
States action in Syria or Ukraine, can be argued to most likely be followed by all actors as it pos-
sibly indicates how other similar events will be addressed by the United States throughout Eura-
sia. This will also be touched upon.          
  
Refocusing on the theoretical framework of this thesis and the basis for the used analytic meth-
od, a discussion will follow resulting in the research design presented in chapter 1.3. 
 
As mentioned in the general introduction, the study of declaratory and operational policies was 
introduced by Paul Nitze in 1956 and then later used by others, more recently Mats Berdal. The 
idea behind Nitze’s theoretical framework was to identify the difference between what politi-
cians said (declared) and planned (actions) and this phenomenon was possible to study more in 
depth as more and more classified data regarding what the politicians actually planned was de-
classified. Paul Nitze defined declaratory policies as “policy statements which have as their aim 
political and psychological effects”19 and action as “the general guidelines which we believe 
should and will in fact govern our actions in various contingencies.”20 Nitze’s theoretical ideas 
have been used in several studies which have found that declaratory policies are not in line with 
the planned actions. For example, David A. Rosenberg’s discussion debated whether or not the 
nuclear policy of the United States was “massive pre-emption” instead of the commonly used 
                                                 
19
 Nitze 1956:187 
20
 Ibid. 
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term “massive retaliation”, Martin Navias’ study on British strategic planning addressed the 
same topic and, within the same spirit but more recently, Mikael Holmström explored the Swe-
dish secret co-operation with NATO during the cold war.
21
  
 
The Norwegian scholar Mats Berdal in his book The United States, Norway and the Cold War, 
1954-60, developed the theoretical idea further. Berdal paid more attention to the different levels 
within the American administrations and discussed the declaratory policies as the strategic or 
overall policies. As Norway seldom was the main topic at the highest political level but still rele-
vant and important on lower levels, Berdal introduced the phrase “operational policies” to re-
place Nitze’s used word actions. In Berdal’s case, the operational level was referring to military 
actors as agencies, armed forces and operational policy was defined as “planning, exercises and 
service programs carried out in peacetime in order to maximize military effectiveness and sup-
port specific missions in the event of war.”22 In conclusion, Berdal argues that analyzing both 
declaratory and operational polices is essential for a complete understanding of, in his case, 
Norway’s place in American strategy, meaning both levels of policies need to be studied in order 
to understand the politics of the Unites States.
23
   
 
In conclusion and simplified, Nitze was focusing on exploring the difference between declarato-
ry policies and what actions were planned, while Berdal was explaining a phenomena by com-
bining the declaratory policies and the planned and conducted activities on different levels within 
the administrations. In short, this thesis develops the theoretical framework in two ways. First, it 
focuses on attention given in different policies or actions rather than exploring differences or 
explaining the outcome. Second, it analyzes the attention given in different policies or actions 
generated from or conducted by the same hierarchical level in the United States administration. 
In this thesis, declaratory policy is seen as statements, visions or intentions, while the opposite of 
declaratory policy is neither Nitze’s planned actions nor Berdal’s polices at different levels but 
defined as implemented actions as they describe decisions implemented or actions conducted. By 
                                                 
21
 Rosenberg 1983; Navias 1991; Holmström, 2011  
22
 Berdal 1997: xvi 
23
 Ibid.: xii-xvii 
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comparing the attention given within the declaratory policy and implemented action over a long 
time frame, trends or patterns of the United State’ focus can be concluded in order to see in what 
degree a United States rebalancing toward Asia as it describes a more comprehensive picture of 
the total United States politics.     
 
The chosen theoretical idea has weaknesses. For instance, it does not study or take into account 
other countries’ perceptions of the United States declaratory polices or implemented actions. 
Such a debate is vital when discussing how trustworthy the United States foreign policy is if it is 
found that declaratory statements and implemented actions deviates too much. Another percep-
tion not taken into account in the theory is the difference between domestic and foreign policy 
because it is possible that some statements are made or actions are taken as effects of domestic 
policy rather than foreign policy.
24
 Both these weaknesses will be addressed within this thesis in 
order to mitigate their effects.     
 
The analysis of chosen indicators for declaratory policies and implemented actions is done by 
combining quantitative (statistics) and qualitative (text analyses) data, a so-called mixed meth-
od,
25
 starting by presenting quantitative data, adding qualitative comments and remarks and pre-
sent conclusions. This method is used in order to reduce the negative sides of each single method 
and stress the positive ones. In most of the previous studies cited, a qualitative analysis is used, 
which focuses on trying to explain or understand. By doing so, however, the analysis often only 
focuses on a few data points as it is very extensive to analyze data in this way. Quantitative data 
or statistics are often used to describe a relationship or describe phenomena but do not explain it 
in context. On the other hand, such results are more undisputable as they are mathematically 
proofed. But this thesis does not present detailed mathematical proof, mathematical significant 
changes, as the purpose is to show general trends and patterns not mathematical correlations. 
Quantitative analysis is more common in natural sciences, whereas qualitative is more common 
in social science. By combing these two, as this thesis describes both declaratory policies as well 
as implemented actions, the best overall picture will be presented. Another way could have been 
                                                 
24
 Andrén 2002: 29-40 
25
 Creswell 2014: 215-233  
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to study the declaratory policy using only text analyses and the implemented actions by using 
only statistics, but then the comparison between the two would have been more difficult as one 
indicator would be based on more subjective analyses while the other would be based on more 
objective analyses. Each chapter analyzing an indicator will be introduced by a short summary of 
the indicators’ relevance and method used when compiling data, as most of the data presented 
had to be collected and formed into a comparable form. Additionally, specific examples have 
been included in order to add qualitative data (when suitable) in order to mitigate possible misin-
terpretations and risking drawing wrong conclusions based only on statistics. Also, to increase 
the reliability of the thesis, annex A has been developed and used as a matrix for sorting different 
organizations, alliances or other geographically connected words. All data are with the author 
and available upon request and can be reached via the Norwegian Defense University library 
homepage.       
 
As such, this thesis differs from the more recent academic works mentioned in the general intro-
duction as well as in this subchapter in four main ways. First, this thesis has used a developed 
version of the theoretical framework of how to study declaratory and operational policies. Sec-
ond, it presents conclusions based on a mixed method,
26
 primarily on quantitative data with add-
ed qualitative data and remarks. Most if not all previously mentioned works have used a qualita-
tive method. Third, it combines historical data with current data, including the developments in 
Ukraine, which makes today’s developments possible to put in a historical perspective. The 
fourth difference is that this thesis attempts to discuss military activities in perspective. One such 
hypothetical example of how to put military activities in perspective is to address the following 
question: what is the best way to defend Europe from a cyber-threat? Does the answer lie in de-
ploying tanks or armored brigades in Europe or by having civilian IT experts working in the 
United States remotely operate advanced technology stationed in Europe? Such a debate is miss-
ing in previously mentioned works.  
 
  
                                                 
26
 Creswell 2014: 215-233  
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This thesis contributes to the general policy debate. Starting with the debate in general, the 
NATO Summit 2014 is approaching with the purpose of, among others, setting the new NATO 
agenda for the post-Afghanistan era including defense planning within nations. One possible 
item on the agenda will be the viewpoints of NATO members regarding the American piv-
ot/rebalancing and how to contribute to burden sharing among the member nations. Such a de-
bate is already ongoing at the political level
27
 and in the academic world,
28
 and the consequences 
are already possible to see at the operational/tactical level. For example, the United States is ask-
ing for support from NATO nations,
29
 and the Norwegian Armed Forces not only participated in 
a staff exercise in South Korea
30
 but also deployed a frigate to the Pacific in 2014 as part of the 
RIMPAC-exercise.
31
 This thesis can contribute to that discussion. But most likely, the situation 
in Ukraine and the Russian actions there will be addressed at the NATO Summit, potentially 
taking the edge off the rebalancing to Asia discussion.  
 
Secondly, this thesis contributes to the development of academic studies within Nitze’s and later 
Berdal’s theoretical frameworks by introducing a third model. Adding to both the chosen theo-
retical framework as the general debate regarding whether the qualitative, quantitative or a com-
bination of the two (the so-called mixed method) is best used for analyzing this type of phenom-
enon, this thesis contributes to the debate by using the mixed method.   
 
1.3 Building the research design, sources and demarcations  
This subchapter will describe the research design, including sources used, indicators chosen and 
demarcations made, including the analyzed time frame and a discussion of measuring the “de-
gree”. After the research design has been summarized in Figure C, the method of comparing the 
chosen indicators will be presented and discussed.  
 
                                                 
27
 Eriksen Söreide, 2014b 
28
 Shea 2013; Ross 2013  
29
 Panetta 2013  
30 
Holthe 2013 
31
 Eriksen Söreide 2014a 
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To be ignorant of what occurred before you were born is to remain always a child. For 
what is the worth of human life, unless it be woven into the life of our ancestors by the 
records of history?
32
 
 
The citation is given in order to discuss the first of three overall demarcations forming the re-
search design: the time period, which is from mid-1945 to the present, May 1, 2014. Two main 
arguments have led to this extensive period of time being studied. First, as the chosen method for 
analyzing the attention given by the United States is based mostly on quantitative data, the 
amount of data available makes the trends more reliable and mitigates the potential of drawing 
incorrect conclusions. That included reducing the risk of drawing conclusions based on “the top-
ic of the day” and as some changes takes time before the results can be seen and described as a 
trend or pattern. Second, the United States’ era of being a superpower started when the Second 
Word War ended in 1945 and continues today. It has been stated in the geopolitical discussion 
that any change of focus within the Eurasian continent can and would then be possible to observe 
more easily than just choosing a short time period, such as by only analyzing the period of the 
latest debate starting in 2011. Unfortunately, all data has not been able to be retrieved for the 
whole period, which will be addressed when necessary.     
 
The second demarcation is done in relation to the previous discussion of geopolitics and the Eur-
asian continent. Studies within that field or within the field of national security often divided 
national power or national security into different systems. One such is done by Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, who divided it into six systems: political, military, economic, technology, culture 
(including popular/mass culture) and education.
33
 Another is done by the sociologist Michael 
Mann, who categorized it into four bases (systems): political, ideological (including norms, val-
ues, rituals and the mass media), economic and military.
34
 And a third is done by the political 
scientist Barry Buzan, who divided it into five areas: military, political, economic, societal and 
                                                 
32
 Cicero 1939: 395 
33
 Brzezinski 1997: 23-25 
34
 Tuathail 2006: 9-10  
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environmental.
35
 In this thesis only political and military indicators are used as this is a master 
thesis in war studies. If other systems mentioned would have been in focus when choosing the 
indicators, the outcome of the analysis could be different; this will be touched upon in Chapter 4.  
 
The third demarcation is the choice of actor studied: the President of the United States. The 
choice has been made because the President has all necessary constitutional powers at the same 
time: chief of state, chief executive, chief diplomat, commander in chief and chief legislator.
36
 
By the power given in the authority, the President counterbalance all lower levels and mitigates 
the actions taken or statements made by these lower levels if they are not in line with the overall 
policy. Therefore, the President can both generate declaratory policies and conduct implemented 
actions. Only analyzing one actor, the President, could of course be questioned as politicians, 
scholars, mass media and the general public are all different actors working within a framework 
of a “dependent ship” that affect each other in different ways as described by the Swedish politi-
cal scientist Lennart Lundqvist.
37
 A possible result of this “dependent ship” was described in the 
introduction as the wording pivot point changed to rebalancing and also touches upon the weak-
ness mentioned of the used theory within the thesis. If other actors were studied, for instance 
how other nations interpret the United States policies or actors working at different levels within 
the administrations, a different result would possibly have emerged but would not have suited the 
purpose of this thesis. As several demarcations are done, the generalization of the finding will be 
discussed more thoroughly in the end of the thesis.      
 
So, after choosing to focus on declaratory policies and implemented actions performed by a sin-
gle actor, the President of the United States within the field of political and military affairs, the 
chosen indicators will need to be explained before presenting the overall research design. Each 
indicator will be more thoroughly discussed as they are analyzed throughout the thesis.      
 
                                                 
35
 Buzan 1991: 19 
36
 Shogan 2014: 1  
37
 Lundquist 2001: 19-23  
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The indicators chosen for analyzing the first research question, “which patterns or trends can be 
identified within the United States declaratory policies to support a rebalancing toward Asia?”, 
are two speeches and two policy documents, all used to present visions or intentions as generat-
ing policies. The two speeches are the inaugural speeches and the State of the Union addresses, 
while the two policy documents analyzed are the National Security Strategies and National Secu-
rity Decisions.     
 
The indicators chosen for analyzing the second specific research question, “which patterns or 
trends can be identified within the United States implemented actions to support a rebalancing 
toward Asia?” are four very different indicators, all representing implemented actions by the 
President of the United States. The four indicators are: travels and visits, deployment of military 
personnel, military infrastructure and distribution of nuclear weapons. 
 
No indicators are chosen for the third research question, ” in what way can European security be 
affected by a potential United States rebalancing toward Asia?”, as it will be discussed based on 
the conclusion drawn from within the first two specific research questions.   
 
As the aim of thesis is to examine and discuss to what degree a rebalancing is present the level of 
degree and concluded will be addressed. The purpose is not to have a statistically definition or a 
certain numerical level, instead the legend describing the degree is general and more open for 
subjective interpretations. The following levels of will be used: No degree, low degree and high 
degree.  
 
The definitions of each of the levels will be as follows: No degree: No signs of a rebalancing can 
be seen within the indicators. Low degree: Vague or insignificant signs of a rebalancing can be 
seen within the indicators: High degree: Clear signs of a rebalancing can be seen within the indi-
cators. The overall conclusion, combining all indicators to an overall conclusion, the level of 
degree will be discussed if not a clear pattern with in all indicators makes a discussion unneces-
sary.    
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The overall research design can be summarized as in figure B.  
 
 
Figure B: Overall research design 
 
Each of the chosen indicators can be discussed whether the reliability is good enough or not, but 
as addressed previously, the total number of indicators and the long time frame analyzed mitigate 
this question.  
 
Two potential indicators, exercises and the deployment of naval assets, were deliberately not 
included in this study. The disposition of naval assets will be discussed in chapter 3.2 (Deploy-
ment of military personnel) and in chapter 3.4 (Distribution of nuclear weapons). The indicator 
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exercises are not studied due to several challenges and key questions. How are exercises com-
pared in a proper and valid way? Is it by length of the exercise in days, the number of deployed 
troops, ships or aircraft, or the purpose of the exercise or the simulated scenario? As an example, 
is it possible to objectively compare a full-scale nuclear response exercise combining a ship in 
the Pacific, a radar station in Greenland, a staff in the United States, the United States President 
exercising his decision-making process from Air Force One flying over South America, versus a 
company of marines conducting beach landings in Korea, or a B-52 global strike training mis-
sion from the United States to Europe or the Pacific and back again or by having two B-52 flying 
along the Chinese border (if it can in fact be classified as an exercise instead of intelligence col-
lecting, war preparations or something else). Another tricky way of discussing exercises is the 
amount soldiers’ working time. If the number of exercises per soldier is increased, that also 
means that after the exercises are complete, the soldiers will need to be compensated with free 
time at other occasions, which actually reduces the readiness or planning capacity on an annual 
basis.  The overall effect of the exercise could also be discussed.        
 
So, in order to be able to compare the indicators the United States Combatant Command struc-
ture has been chosen as the presentation matrix.
38
 The United States has divided the world into 
six geographical areas of military responsibility, Africa Command (AFRICOM), Central Com-
mand (CENTCOM), European Command (EUCOM), Northern Command (NORTHCOM), 
Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and the Pacific Command (PACOM), geographically pre-
sented in Figure C.
39
 The areas have changed borders and increased in numbers during the 
timeframe studied, but the current structure from 2011 has been utilized throughout the thesis. 
None of the data analyzed has been reported in this structure, which means that manual calcula-
tion faults or misplacing minor data posts could have occurred. The misplacing could easily have 
happened between the border between the Northern, the Pacific and the Southern Commands, 
but if it occurred, it is of marginal effect to the overall patterns and tendencies of the analysis, 
and it does not change the overall conclusions. 
                                                 
38
 Title 10, United States Code: Armed Forces, §164 page 161   
39
 Department of Defense 2011b 
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Figure C: The World with combatant commanders’ areas of responsibility.40 
 
Criticism of the chosen layout of the comparison matrix lies understandably with the parts of 
European Command situated within Asia and also in Central Command. Another risk of misin-
terpretation is that the United States State Department uses another way of dividing the world,
41
 
but this has been mitigated by transforming collected data it into the combatant command struc-
ture.  
 
This study uses a mixture of primary and secondary sources. All data used within the four de-
claratory indicators is based upon primary sources while the data within the implemented actions 
                                                 
40
 Department of Defense 2011b  
41
 Department of State (n.d.) 
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indicators is primarily secondary. The majority of all documents are official U.S. non- and de-
classified documents, speeches and statistics which give an official view. For one indicator, the 
disposition of nuclear weapons (chapter 4.4.), data from other scholars has been used in addition 
to the official U.S. sources. It should be noted that further classified information does exist and 
most likely changes some of the details, but it will most likely not change the outcome of the 
analysis except within one indicator which is addressed.   
 
A comment regarding the official statistics is in place. Several of the documents used, especially 
regarding the implemented actions indicators (chapter 3), are compiled in several steps within 
the U.S. administration and could include miscalculations, as shown in some examples in the 
material. The miscalculations seem to be more common in older documents where no computer 
assistance was present and only manual typewriters were used. Second, the definitions of the 
official statistics are not coherent throughout the analyzed time period. Comments are included 
for both of these parameters throughout the document when necessary. 
 
As several demarcations are made regarding the theoretical approach, method used, time period 
studied, indicators chose etc, a discussion of how general the results in this thesis are will be ad-
dressed in the end of chapter four. 
    
1.4 Structure of the thesis  
Before addressing the first research question, a short summery of how the thesis is structured 
with additional remarks. This thesis is divided into four main parts. The introduction in chapter 
one set the overall framework by formulating the overall aim, the three research questions, and it 
presents the research design and the theoretical framework, including the demarcations made. 
The following two chapters analyze and answer the first two research questions – declaratory 
policies in chapter two and the implemented actions in chapter three. The fourth and last part of 
the thesis addresses three things, first it summarize the findings in chapter two and three and by 
that answers the first part of the aim of the thesis, then it continues with discussing the summa-
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rized findings implications for Europe and,  by that answers the third research question as well as 
the second part of the aim of the thesis and finally discusses how general the conclusion are.  
 
As most of the data presented is based upon self-made databases, the reasons for choosing each 
indicator and the way the data has been collected and categorized need explanations. That has 
led to the fact that both chapter two and three have the same number of chapters and indicators, 
but the number of pages (words) in chapter three is more than in chapter two for explained rea-
sons.    
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2 Declaratory policies 
The purpose of this chapter is to answer the first specific research question – Which patterns or 
trends can be identified within the United States declaratory policies to support a rebalancing 
toward Asia? The chapter is divided into six parts, starting with an introduction, followed by an 
analysis of four indicators (chapter 2.1 – 2.4), then followed by a summary of the findings (chap-
ter 2.5). Each chapter discussing an indicator will follow the same format, starting with an intro-
duction of the indicator’s relevance, followed by which data has been used and how it has been 
compiled, and then it will present statistics with added qualitative remarks before finally present-
ing the conclusions. 
  
2.1 Inaugural Addresses  
Every elected and sworn in president of the United States has delivered a speech on his inaugura-
tion day, starting April 30, 1789 with George Washington. One of the purposes of the speech is 
for the Presidents to “present their vision of America and to set forth their goals for the nation.”42 
Because it receives international attention and is always thoroughly analyzed afterward, the Pres-
ident has a unique possibility to mention or exclude areas and subjects of focus. 
 
Since January 20, 1945, 18 inaugural addresses have been held.
43
 By counting
44
 how many times 
nations, cities, agreements or alliances have been mentioned in each speech and categorizing the 
results within each combatant command, it would be possible to identify if a possible shift of 
attention is present. Before analyzing or commenting on the results, some remarks about the pro-
cess need clarification. Several addresses mention communism and dictatorship, but those sen-
tences have not been taken into account. Communism or dictatorship in most speeches usually 
refers to the Soviet Union, but could also address China, Cuba or other states and could therefore 
not explicitly be categorized within a certain combatant command. As most of the speeches ad-
dress domestic issues such as labor, unemployment, the Northern Command (Bermuda, Canada, 
                                                 
42
 Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural ceremonies 2013b 
43
 Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural ceremonies 2013a 
44
 See annex A for the matrix used for commonality  
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Mexico, Puerto Rico and United States) has been excluded. A consequence of this exclusion is 
that Hawaii, belonging to the Pacific Command, is not counted as being within it because Hawaii 
has not been explicitly mentioned when talking about the United States as a whole. Still, the 
general trends can be argued to be valid. The data leading to the figures presented are available 
upon request to the author and can also be reached via the Norwegian Defense University Li-
brary, Oslo.   
 
Presented below are two figures, D and E. Figure D shows the total number of times nations, 
cities, agreements or alliances have been mentioned in each speech and are categorized by com-
batant command (excluding the Northern Command) from 1945 – 2013. Figure E shows the 
comparison in percent of the result presented in figure D.    
 
 
Figure D: Inaugural addresses. Total number of times nations, cities, agreements or alliances have been mentioned 
categorized into each combatant command 1945 – 2013, excluding NORTHCOM 
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Figure E: Inaugural addresses: In per cent the number of times nations, cities, agreements or alliances have been 
mentioned categorized into each combatant command 1945 – 2013, excluding NORTHCOM 
 
Because this indicator is an analysis of several delivered speeches, it should be mentioned that 
there is no maximum number of words or a maximum length for each speech. Each speech is 
individual, but the average length of speeches analyzed is 1900 words.
45
 Neither figure D nor E 
shows nor reflects the context in which the words categorized within each combatant commands 
are mentioned, i.e. the historical, future, economic, political or military contexts. Neither does it 
show if it is mentioned in a positive (friendly, alliance), neutral (just mentioned) or negative 
(threat, enemy) context. Despite this fact, the indicator still reflects the chosen wordings of the 
President of the United States and the attention paid to areas outside the Northern Command.  
 
Some general conclusions: even though it is not fully compatible because the Pacific Command 
includes more than just continental Asia (Australia, for example), it can be stated that the focus 
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 Peters 2013 
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outside the Northern Command has been mostly on the Eurasian continent. The main attention 
has been on the European Command, followed by the Pacific and then closely by the Central. 
The African and Southern Commands have just marginally been mentioned, except for the Cu-
ban missile crisis in the 1960s. It should be noted that variations over time are significant and 
that the number of times areas outside the Northern Command are mentioned is rather low, 
which supports the argument that the wording used is being carefully chosen and thereby reflects 
the attention of the United States.   
 
As historical events have unfolded, inaugural addresses have unquestionably been affected by 
them. Examples are the Korean War (1950-53), the Cuba missile crisis (1962), the Vietnam War 
(1969-1977), the collapse of the Soviet Union with the establishment of a new Europe (1989-
1997) and more recently, the developments in Afghanistan and Iraq (2005-2013). The historic 
attention paid to the Pacific Command is closely tied to those historical events, and it has only 
been mentioned more times than the European Command on two occasions, in 1977 and 2013.  
 
It can be argued vaguely and possibly prematurely that more recently there has been a regained 
attention on the Pacific Command during the second term of the Presidency of Obama, starting 
in 2013. If it is present, it is numerically very modest and could be argued as being at the ex-
pense of the Central Command. Percentagewise, the increased focus could be argued as being at 
the expense of both the Central and European Commands. If this argument is used, it should also 
be noted that the focus on the African Command has also increased, and even more importantly, 
the attention on the Southern Command is just as big as the attention on the Pacific. The inaugu-
ral address in 2017 will determine if there is such a trend. Also worth noting is that the speech in 
2013 was the first since 1957 that all five combatant commands outside the Northern Command 
were mentioned.  Unfortunately, this is not possible to see in the figures as the Central Command 
line is covering the African line, but it is possible to view in the data material. This broadened 
focus will be further explored in chapter 2.5.  
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In short, the conclusion for this indicator is that there is no degree of a general rebalancing to-
ward Asia. A low degree of rebalancing might be present starting in 2013, but it may be prema-
ture to reach this conclusion before having additional data such as the next inaugural speech.  
 
2.2 State of the Union addresses 
The State of the Union address is delivered annually by the President of the United States and 
originates from the United States Constitution. In this speech, the President declares and outlines 
the policy and agenda of the administration and includes rhetorical arguments, ceremonial tradi-
tions, history and optimism for the future. The State of the Union address is the only annual 
planned and recurring event where the President can showcase all constitutional powers at the 
same time: chief of state, chief executive, chief diplomat, commander in chief and chief legisla-
tor.
46
  
 
Since mid-1945, several State of the Union addresses have been held or forwarded. In this thesis, 
only the oral addresses in front of a joint Congress and formally called States of the Union ad-
dresses are analyzed. Therefore, the written statement in 1946 and the speeches in 1981, 1989, 
1993, 2001 and 2009 are excluded. Also excluded are the State of the Union addresses released 
immediately before leaving office, as in 1953, 1961, 1981, 1969 and 1977, because the President 
is more reflecting upon his legacy than setting the agenda and creating policies in such an ad-
dress.
47
 Also worth mentioning is that in some years, the speech has been given as a summary of 
or as an addition to written statements, as was the case in 1956, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1978, 1979 
and 1980. However, this has not been taken into account in the statistics presented. In summary 
61, State of the Union addresses are analyzed beginning in 1947 and ending in 2014.
48
 
 
                                                 
46
 Shogan 2014: 1  
47
 Peters 2014 
48
 1947-1968 (22), 1970-1976 (7), 1978-1980 (3), 1982-1988 (7), 1990-1992 (3), 1994-2000 (7), 2002-2008 (7) and 
2010-2014 (5) = 61 
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By counting the number of times a nation, area, city, agreement or alliance has been mentioned 
in each speech and arranging the findings into each combatant command, general trends can be 
concluded.
49
 As most of the speeches relate to domestic issues such as labor or unemployment, 
the Northern Command, including Bermuda, Canada, Mexico, Puerto Rico and United States, 
has been excluded. A consequence of this exclusion is that Hawaii, belonging to the Pacific 
Command, is not included within that command because it explicitly has not been mentioned 
when discussing the United States as a whole. However, the general trends can still be argued to 
be valid. 
   
Presented below are two figures, F and G. Figure F shows the total number of times nations, cit-
ies, agreements or alliances have been mentioned each year 1947 – 2014 and are categorized into 
each combatant command, excluding the Northern Command. Figure G shows the comparison in 
percent, of the result presented in figure F.     
 
 
Figure F: State of the Union addresses: Total number of times nations, cities, agreements or alliances have been 
mentioned each year 1947-2014, categorized into each combatant command 1947 – 2014, excluding NORTHCOM. 
                                                 
49
 See annex A for the matrix used for commonality  
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Figure G: State of the Union Addresses. In percent the number of times nations, cities, agreements or alliances 
have been mentioned each year 1947-2014, categorized into each Combat Command, excluding NORTHCOM. 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the figures do not show in which context the word within 
each combatant command is mentioned.  
 
It can be argued as a general conclusion that the main attention given in the State of the Union 
address, outside the Northern Command, is the Eurasian continent.
50
 Historically, the main focus 
has been on the European Command, followed by the Pacific and the Central Commands, but 
variations are present. An interesting conclusion is that since the beginning of the 1980s, the 
Central Command has been mentioned more times than the Pacific in total number per decade 
and more often than the European Command since the beginning of the 2000s. The focus on the 
                                                 
50
 With the remark that geographical area of Eurasia is not fully compatible with the European and Pacific Com-
mand as elaborated in chapter 2.1 
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African and Southern Commands is marginal, but variations can be identified, such as the Cuban 
missile crisis (1962) or the Reagan administration’s focus in South America in the 1980s.    
 
In a historical perspective, the trend is quite clear that the number of times European Command 
is mentioned is decreasing (albeit with some exceptions), while the total for the other combatant 
commands is increasing, both in actual numbers and in percentages. Some historical events can 
be identified, such as the Korean War in the 1950s, the breakup of the Soviet Union in the be-
ginning of the 1990s and the focus on the Central Command during most of the 2000s. The Vi-
etnam War and the focus on the Pacific Command during this time frame is more obvious in the 
statistics in the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s than later in the 1970s, when compared to the 
statistics during the Korean War or the more recent focus on the Central Command. Starting at 
the end of the 1990s/beginning of the 2000s, a more balanced approach between the European 
and Pacific Commands can be identified.  
 
Regarding the debate of rebalancing, the statistics show that the number of times the European 
Command and to a lesser extent the Southern Command have been mentioned has decreased, 
while the number of times where the Central and to a much lesser extent the African Command 
have been mentioned has generally increased. The Pacific Command has been mentioned fewer 
and fewer times, but on average to a much lesser extent than European. It cannot be argued that 
the Pacific has been prioritized in favor of the European, but it can be argued that the Pacific has 
been reduced less than the European, both in favor of other combatant commands.     
 
An even more interesting conclusion is that since the latest discussion of the pivot or rebalancing 
to Asia started in 2011, the trend of mentioning the European and especially the Central Com-
mand is positive while the other commands are negative (the Southern Command in 2014 is ex-
cluded). Another conclusion drawn from the figures shows a slight trend since the mid-1990s for 
the speeches to cover more of all the combatant commands when compared to previous years.  
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In conclusion, no degree of a current rebalancing toward the Pacific Command can be identified 
with this indicator, either. With the exception of major events described, it can be argued from a 
historical perspective that a high degree of rebalancing occurred from the mid-1990s to mid-
2000s and with a short peak in 2011, but since 2013 it has been normalized to more historical 
levels.  
 
2.3 National Security Strategy  
One of the purposes, at least in theory, for having a national security strategy is to communicate 
the government’s intent to both foreign and domestic key audiences. The United States produces 
several strategy documents, for instance the Quadrennial Defense, but the pinnacle of the nation-
al security strategy architecture is the National Security Strategy signed by the President of the 
United States.
51
 Even though some say it is a wish list mentioning everything without any eco-
nomic limitations,
52
 it can still be argued and will be shown that it is possible to conclude where 
the main areas of the President’s attention are.  
 
The United States has released numerous National Security Strategies over the years, but the 
most likely known strategies are the ones that have been publicly since the implementation of the 
Goldwater-Nicholas Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. According to the 
Goldwater-Nicholas Act, the President shall forward the National Security Strategy annually to 
Congress on the date he submits his annual budget request. In reality, National Security Strate-
gies were submitted annually from 1987 to 1999, except for 1989 and 1992, and more recently 
only publicly released in 2002, 2006 and 2010.
53
 While working on chapter 2.4, a number of 
documents headings revealed that even before the Goldwater-Nicholas Act, National Security 
Strategies were produced.
54
 These documents were approved by the President in 1948, 1950, 
                                                 
51
 Dale 2013: 1-3 
52
 Betts 2004: 8 
53
 Dale 2013: 1-3 
54
 All displayed were not named National Security Strategies but superseded or was superseded by later documents 
meaning they had the same status/purpose and thereby can be argued being National Security Strategies.  
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1952, 1953 (three documents), 1954, 1955, 1956, 1957, 1958, 1959, 1977, 1981, 1982 and 
1986.
55
 No documents with the similar (or very narrow) heading could be identified during the 
1960s and beginning of 1970s, which makes the conclusions drawn vague for this period of time.  
 
By using the same method as in chapter 2.1 and 2.2, counting each time a nation, city, agreement 
or alliance has been mentioned within all 30 documents and categorizing into each combatant 
command, conclusions can be drawn on general patterns relevant for this thesis.
56
 Presented be-
low are two figures, Figure H and I. Figure H shows the total number of times wordings have 
been categorized into each combatant command, excluding the Northern Command. Figure I 
show the same as Figure H, but in percentage form.       
 
Figure H: National Security Strategies. Number of times nations, cities, agreements or alliances have been men-
tioned each year, 1948-2010, categorized into each combatant command 
                                                 
55
 National Security Council 1948; 1950; 1952; 1953a; 1953b; 1953c; 1954; 1955; 1956; 1957; 1958; 1959; 1977; 
The White House 1981; 1982; 1986.   
56
 See annex A for the matrix used for commonality  
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Figure I: National Security Strategies. The number of times nations, cities, agreements or alliances have been men-
tioned each year, 1948-2010, in percentage form and categorized into each combatant command  
 
Arguably, the data could be divided into two segments, 1948 to 1959 and 1977 to 2010. The 
analysis will comment on this matter as well.   
 
With the same reservations as in the previous two chapters, the general conclusion is that the 
focus of the National Security Strategies outside the Northern Command has been on the Eura-
sian continent. Historically the European Command has been mentioned the most, followed by 
the Pacific and Central Commands.  
 
In the first segment of the data, 1948 to 1959, the conclusion can be made that the number of 
times that the European Command was mentioned drastically decreased, the mentioning of the 
Pacific Command remained at the same level and the other commands remained almost unmen-
tioned. Starting already in the 1977 strategy, the conclusion can be made that, in numerical for-
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mat, the focus has first been on the European Command, then followed by Pacific. But even 
more interesting is that the number of times the other combatant commands have been men-
tioned greatly increased between 1977 and 1999 scattering the attention to more areas than ever 
before. A drastic difference can be seen in the 2002, 2006 and 2010 figures which indicate a less 
mentioning of geographic locations in comparison to previous years, including much less atten-
tion given the European Command and generally less to all others, especially in 2010. As the 
National Security Strategy 2010 has not been superseded, conclusions since the last debate start-
ed in 2010 are not possible to conclude, which a new version when released possibly will.  
  
In percent, the overall trend shows that the focus on the European Command has decreased con-
sistently in favor of all other combatant commands, especially the Pacific, with some minor ex-
ceptions. An interesting side note is that the trend actually changed in 2006 in favor of the Euro-
pean in comparison to the Pacific Command.  
 
Likewise, the conclusion from this indicator is that no degree of a current rebalancing toward the 
Pacific Command can be identified.  Except for the major events described, it can be argued that 
historically a high degree of rebalancing occurred from the mid-1990s to 1999, but it has been 
normalized again since 2002.  
 
2.4 Presidential Directives regarding National Security  
Since the establishment of the National Security Council in 1947, the President has approved 
policies by signing national security documents. All Presidents since 1947 have done this differ-
ently, named the documents differently and had different methods of producing the documents, 
but the effect and purpose of the documents have been the same – to set policies.57  
 
The documents have most often been highly classified and the approved documents do not need 
to be registered in the Federal Register, which means that the documents reveal the correct focus 
                                                 
57
 Relyea 2008: CRS-8—CRS-9 
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of the National Security Council and its work.
58
 Therefore it could be argued that by sorting each 
document heading into the combatant command(s) it belongs to, a pattern of focus might be pos-
sible to identify. Of course, it can be stated that the most important work is not written down, 
illustrated by Henry Kissinger’s remark that “the most important decisions were made without 
informing the bureaucracy, and without the use of NSSMs or NSDMs.”59 The abbreviations Kis-
singer refers to are the National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM) and the National Security 
Decision Memoranda (NSDM), which were the Nixon administration’s versions of National Se-
curity Decisions or approved policies and studies that normally lead up to policies.
60
 Despite this 
statement, it can be argued that the work provided reflects what the United States was working 
on and by that measure, fulfilling the purpose of being a declaratory policy indicator. In 1999, 
the White House released the headings of most National Security Council Presidentially-
approved documents.
61
 The historical list included Presidential policies from 1961 to 1993 (Pres-
ident Kennedy to President George H.W. Bush).
62
 In the background analysis of this thesis, the 
released list was compared to the documents that are available through each former President’s 
library. Because the list released in 1999 did not incorporate documents from President Truman, 
Eisenhower or the Presidents after George H.W. Bush, a compilation of all headings or docu-
ments available on the internet was made in order to be able to analyze the period 1947-2014. 
The result of the collection is available at the Norwegian Defense University Library or upon 
request to the author.  
 
Of all 1,723 officially stated existing documents, the compilation resulted in the finding of 1,663 
of them. As shown in figure J below, the number and percentage of unavailable headings in-
creases for the Clinton, George W. Bush and Obama administrations. Still, it can be argued that 
if the Clinton, George W. Bush and Obama administrations would have liked to state or highlight 
an increased focus on Asia, for example, the headings or the documents could have been leaked 
                                                 
58
 Relyea, 2008: CRS-9 
59
 Seymour 1983: 35  
60
 Relyea, 2008: CRS-10 
61
 The White House Office of the Press Secretary 1999  
62
 National Security Council 1999  
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to the press or an official press statement released. Therefore, even though the percentage of 
found documents is lower, the results could still be argued to be valid.  
 
President Officially total num-
ber of decisions 
Number of found headings 
or full documents 
In percent, found head-
ings or documents 
Truman 141 134 95,0 
Eisenhower 225 212 94,2 
Kennedy 272 272 100 
Johnston 100 100 100 
Nixon 264 264 100 
Ford 84 84 100 
Carter 63 62 98,4 
Reagan 326 325 99,7 
Bush, G.H.W. 79 76 96,2 
Clinton 75 57 76,0 
Bush, G.W. 66 56 84,8 
Obama 28 21 75,0 
Figure J: Number of Security Council decisions known and found 1946-2014
63
 
 
Presented below are two figures, K and L. Figure K presents the total number of times nations, 
cities, agreements or alliances have been mentioned in the headings of an document, categorized 
into each combatant command 1945 – 2013. Figure L shows the comparison in percent of the 
results presented in figure K.     
                                                 
63
 Sources of the declared number per administrations: Truman: The White House Office (n.d); Eisenhower: Corre-
lation between The White House (n.d) and Dwight D. Eisenhower Library; Kennedy trough Bush G.H.W.: The 
White House [1999]; Clinton: W J Clinton Presidential Library (n.d.); Bush G.W: Bush (2009). The latest found 
was number 66; Obama: Administration of Barack Obama (2014).  The latest found was number 28, January 17, 
2014  
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Figure K: Presidential Directives: Total number of times nations, cities, agreements or alliances have been men-
tioned categorized into each combatant command 1947 – 2014 
 
 
Figure L: Presidential Directives: In percent, the number of times nations, cities, agreements or alliances have been 
mentioned categorized into each combatant command 1947 – 2014. 
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Because figure K and L have several (eight) parameters and as the European and Pacific Com-
mand have more focus within this thesis, two more figures, M and N, are presented. Both Figure 
M and N shows the exact same information as K and L but only displaying the European and 
Pacific Commands and the classified numbers, done in order to make it more easier for the read-
er to see details. 
  
Figure M: Presidential Directives: Total number of times nations, cities, agreements or alliances have been men-
tioned, categorized into EUCOM, PACOM or classified categories, 1947 – 2014 
 
Figure N: Presidential Directives: In percent, the number of times nations, cities, agreements or alliances have been 
mentioned, categorized into EUCOM, PACOM or classified, 1947 – 2014 
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Before concluding, two remarks must be addressed. The first remark concerns the category 
NORTHCOM (presented in figures K and L), which includes documents with more general 
headings such as nuclear planning and protection against nuclear attacks. It could be argued that 
if used differently, the headings now sorted within the Northern Command instead could have 
increased the European Command numbers since the Soviet Union was the main focus of nucle-
ar planning.  However, that would have excluded the nuclear planning against China that will be 
addressed in chapter 3.4. The second remark concerns the category “classified.” If it is later dis-
covered that most of the headings within that category could be categorized within the Pacific 
Command, a significant focus on this command would be identified from the mid- or late- 1990s. 
 
In a historical view, the focus of the Presidential directive regarding national security outside the 
Northern Command has been on the Eurasian continent,
64
 with the main focus on the European 
and Pacific Commands. This historical trend can be argued to have ended in the beginning or 
middle of the 1990s, as almost no directives can be categorized into geographic locations. In-
stead, it can be argued that more of the directives are more general and focus on subjects such as 
terrorism, anti-drug and nuclear proliferation, rather than geographic locations. Another argu-
ment opposing the last conclusion can be that the National Security Council has become more 
aware of the importance of having more general titles and headings as more documents are now 
publicly available, officially or unofficially.   
 
In line with the earlier conclusions, no degree of a rebalancing toward the Pacific Command can 
be concluded by this indicator. However, it is important to again highlight the remark that cur-
rently classified documents could change the conclusions when they are eventually released.   
 
2.5 Summary of the declaratory indicators 
In this chapter four declaratory policy indicators have been analyzed in order to be able to an-
swer the first research question – Which patterns or trends can be identified within the United 
                                                 
64
 With the remark that geographical area of Eurasia is not fully compatible with the European and Pacific Com-
mand as elaborated in chapter 2.1 
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States declaratory policies to support a rebalancing toward Asia? The chapter will start by sum-
marizing the findings of the indicators studied, answer the first research question and conclude 
with a general discussion before turning to the second indicator, Implemented Actions in chapter 
three.  
 
Four general findings will be discussed as a summary of the findings and conclusions within the 
studied indicators, which will lead to the answer of the first research question.  
  
First, outside the Northern Command, the declaratory policies of the President of the United 
States have historically focused on the Eurasian continent,
65
 which supports the theoretical 
framework of this thesis regarding the importance of geopolitics and the Eurasian continent. 
However, a, vague but present tendency in later years within three of the indicators shows that 
the attention given is more spread out among all five combatant commands outside the Northern 
Command.  This trend is possibly an indication of less attention being paid to geopolitics in a 
geographical sense and could be elaborated upon, but here it is only a suggestion for further re-
search since it is not within the purpose of this thesis.    
 
Second, historically, the focus of all indicators studied has been on the European Command, but 
historical events such as the Korean War, the Cuban missile crisis, the Vietnam War and lately 
the wars in Afghanistan/Iraq have received attention in the indicators studied.   
 
Third, a rebalancing conclusion will need to be divided into long, short and very short term hori-
zons. There is only one clear conclusion to be drawn within the long term rebalancing horizon: 
the attention paid to Europe is generally decreasing and the focus on all other combatant com-
mands is generally increasing. There is no general conclusion to be drawn showing a rebalancing 
to the Pacific Command. In a short-term perspective, in this case starting in the 1980s until the 
present, a low to high degree of rebalancing first two then from the Pacific Command can be 
                                                 
65
 With the remark that geographical area of Eurasia is not fully compatible with the European and Pacific Com-
mand as elaborated in chapter 2.1 
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argued within two of the indicators. Another weak but present trend is a rebalancing from the 
Pacific and later the European Command to the Central Command. The short-term horizon con-
clusion will be presented separately as it deserves additional attention. 
 
Fourth and final, since the discussion restarted in 2011 and continues to the present (with one 
major remark discussed later), in the very short term the indicators describe the degree of a re-
balancing to the Pacific Command as none existing, in one case very low, if present or in this 
case a negative degree meaning rebalancing away from the Pacific Command. One inaugural 
speech has been held since 2011, and that speech only vaguely supported a rebalancing (the Pa-
cific and Southern Commands mentioned two times each, all other combatant commands, ex-
cluding Northern, mentioned one time each). Three State of the Union addresses have been held 
since then, and an increase in the number of times the Pacific Command is mentioned can be 
seen in 2011. However, since then a general trend away from the Pacific and the African Com-
mands can be noticed in favor of the other three combatant commands, excluding the Northern. 
There has been no National Security Strategy published since 2010 so no conclusion can be 
made from that indicator, but the latest trend from 2002 until 2010 was in accordance with the 
trend regarding State of the Union address – a decrease in focus on the Pacific Command. No 
rebalancing toward the Pacific could be identified within the fourth indicator, Presidential Di-
rective, either, except for – and this is the major remark – if later studies show that several if not 
all of the presently classified Presidential Directives headings could be categorized as within the 
Pacific Command.     
            
So, the answer to the first research question “Which patterns or trends can be identified within 
the United States declaratory policies to support a rebalancing toward Asia?” -  based on stated 
preconditions is: No degree of a rebalancing toward the Pacific Command can be identified. De-
spite this conclusion, the focus on the European Command, in comparison to other combatant 
commands has decreased. 
  
Does this mean that the United States is not focusing on the Pacific Command within declaratory 
policies? No, the United States has had a leading role in the Pacific since the end of the Cold 
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War, which has been publicly stated in several National Security Strategies including this exam-
ple from 1954:  
 
The U.S. should exert its leadership in the Pacific toward the creation of a position of 
strength calculated to block Communist expansion in the Far East and Southern Asia. In 
its Pacific role, the United States should be less influenced by the European allies than in 
respect to Atlantic affairs
66
  
 
The United States has emphasized being a Pacific Nation in declaratory statements, i.e. the Na-
tional Security Strategies presented in 1987, 1993, 1995, 1996 and 2006.
67
 The importance of 
such declarations, since President Obama also declared the United States an Arctic nation
68
 and 
announced a refocus in Africa,
69
 could of course be discussed. Also worth mentioning because it 
can be argued to have not received the same attention as the article in 2011, Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton’s travel to the African continent in 2012 was according to the U.S. State Depart-
ment in order to “…emphasize US policy commitments outlined in the Presidential Di-
rective…”70 The Presidential Directive referred to was most likely Presidential Directive number 
16, U.S. Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa,
71
 decided earlier the same year.    
 
The declaratory statements of President Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2011 
described in the introduction are much in line with the Pacific vision presented by President 
Clinton in the National Security Strategy in 1997 stating:  
  
                                                 
66
 National Security Council 1954: 6 
67
 The White House 1987: 15; 1993: 7;  1995: 28; 1996: 40; 2006: 40 
68
 The White House 2010: 50 
69
 Ibid. 
70
 Allison 2012  
71
 Obama 2012 
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Second, America must look across the Pacific as well as across the Atlantic. Over the last 
four years, we have made significant progress in creating a stable, prosperous Asia Pacif-
ic community. In this endeavor, we must reinforce our ties to Japan, the Republic of Ko-
rea, Australia and our ASEAN friends and allies
72
  
 
Already in the first sentence of this quote, an important aspect of United States’ view of the Eu-
ropean and Pacific Command as one entity not separately. This way of looking at the Eurasian 
continent as one entity is found in the declaratory indicators if studied more in detail. Additional-
ly it can be mentioned that the word Eurasia is mentioned in the National Security Strategies of 
1948, 1950, 1953, 1955, 1986, 1987 1988, 1990, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 and 
2006.
73
 
 
A final conclusion will be drawn using the indicators and discussion above that there is a possi-
bility the United States is focusing more broadly on other areas outside the Eurasian continent 
and therefore risks overstretching its capacity as previous empires have historically done. Of 
course, it can be argued that it is not possible to overstretch in a declaratory way but only after 
implementing actions. On the contrary, and as discussed regarding the negative side of this 
methodological approach, it is possible to overstretch based upon a declaratory focus that is too 
broad. In such a case, trustworthiness can be challenged or tested, creating vulnerabilities for a 
competitor nations or alliances to challenge.  One such example can be argued to be the case in 
Syria when President Obama declared a “red line” that Syria could not cross, but despite this 
warning, they crossed the “red line” later.74 This risk of overstretching is also discussed in a 
Princeton paper from 2004,
75
 but the risk is discussed to be as a consequence of a missing bal-
ancing of power since the end of the Cold War. The risk of overstretching is not unknown within 
                                                 
72
 National Security Council 1997: 2 
73
 National Security Council 1948: 5; 1950: 6; 1953c: 8; 1955: 5; 1997: Part III. Integrated regional approaches; The 
White House 1986: 2; 1987: 27; 1988: 19; 1990: 1; 1993: 7; 1994: 21; 1995: 25; 1996: 35; 1998: 10; 1999: 9 & 
2006: 2     
74
 Farley 2013 
75
 Betts 2004: 32   
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the United States administrations. As an example, in 1954 the President of the United States ad-
dressed this issue at the National Security Council by stating “…absolutely the worst thing that 
could happen to us would be to find ourselves with U.S. forces scattered all over the world in the 
event of a general war”76 which brings us to the study the Implemented actions.    
                                                 
76
 Eisenhower 1954: Paragraph 12   
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3 Implemented actions 
The purpose of this chapter is to answer the second specific research question – Which patterns 
or trends can be identified within the United States implemented actions to support a rebalancing 
toward Asia? The chapter is divided into six parts, starting with an introduction, followed by the 
analyses of the four chosen implemented actions indicators and ending with a summary of the 
findings. Each chapter discussing an indicator will follow the same format, starting with an in-
troduction of the indicator’s relevance, followed by which data has been used and how it has 
been compiled, and then it will present statistics with added qualitative remarks before finally 
presenting the conclusions. 
 
3.1 Travels and visits  
Today it has become easier to travel around the globe in comparison with in the 1940s. The de-
velopments of jet aircraft, leading to the ability to easily cross the oceans and travel quickly, 
fundamentally changed international politics. On the other hand, the development of more mod-
ern communication equipment reduced the need for traveling and offered the possibility of call-
ing or having face-to-face meetings via video conference. The conclusion of these two argu-
ments is important because it means that in the beginning of the period studied, travels should 
have been of more importance as a method of communication rather than simply symbolic. At 
the same time, it still has always been a historically symbolic gesture. Today, when it is easier to 
communicate via using modern technology, it can be argued that the symbolic value of a visit is 
higher than the actual need. Other scholars
77
 also frequently refer to official travels and visits by 
addressing their frequency to certain locations, which further stress the importance of this indica-
tor.   
 
So, if the President of the United States would like to stress the importance of meeting or sym-
bolically being seen in other nations, or conversely, receive visits from foreign leaders,
78
 it can 
                                                 
77
 Engelbrekt 2013: 139 & 147  
78
 Foreign leaders are in this thesis including Head of State or Head of Government but also the highest representa-
tive of Palestinian territories and the spiritual leader Dali Lama) 
  Page 49 
(134) 
   
 
 
   
 
 
be measured by counting the number of times such visits have happened in order to see if new 
patterns can be established. In this indicator, the travels of the President of the United States’ 
primary representative for foreign relations, the Secretary of State, have also been analyzed be-
cause “the Secretary of State travels to all corners of the world to do his job. His duties as Secre-
tary include acting as the President's representative at all international forums, negotiating trea-
ties and other international agreements, and conducting every day, face-to-face diplomacy”79 As 
three different types of travels or visits are presented, the chapter is divided into three parts: first 
an introduction with general remarks, followed by data presented in three subchapters (United 
States Presidents’ travels abroad, chapter 2.1.1, visits by foreign leaders to the United States 
President, chapter 2.1.2, travels by the United States Secretary of State abroad, 2.1.3) and ending 
in chapter 2.1.4 with the conclusions of the findings, as they are general for all three subchapters.  
 
Counting each travel/visit and categorizing it within each combatant command can identify 
trends. First, some remarks about the data collected. The administration’s officially compiled and 
published data for the United States Presidents’ travels80 and for the foreign leaders’ visits81 in-
cludes data until May 1, 2014 while the Secretary of States’ travels includes information until 
May 5, 2014.
82
 The data is combined from different official homepages. The domestic travels are 
not included, which means that the Northern Command statistics only include travels to or visits 
from Bermuda, Canada, Mexico and Puerto Rico. Also, Hawaii is not recognized as travel 
abroad and thereby not included in the data for the Pacific Command. A visit to the Vatican is 
counted as one visit, but stops for refueling, if not combined with any meetings or other official 
business, are not counted. All data are available upon request of the author and can also be found 
at the Norwegian Defense University Library homepage.   
    
                                                 
79
 Department of State 2014b  
80
 Department of State Office of the Historian 2012a; The White House 2014, schedule Jan. 1, 2013- May 1, 2014 
81
 Department of State Office of the Historian 2012c; The White House 2014, schedule Jan. 1, 2013- May 1, 2014 
82
 Department of State Office of the Historian 2012b; Department of State 2013; Department of State 2014a 
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3.1.1 The United States Presidents’ travels abroad  
Presented below are two figures, Figure O and P. Figure O presents the number of times a U.S. 
President has made a visit within each combatant command from mid-1945 to May 1, 2014. Fig-
ure P presents the same statistics as Figure O but in percentages. Of note, the data sets contain no 
information of any travels abroad during September 8, 1947 to October 19, 1953.  
 
 
 
Figure O: Travels – The number of times a U.S. President has made a visit within each combatant command from 
1945 – May 1, 2014. 
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Figure P: Travels – In percentages, the number of times a U.S. President has made a visit within each combatant 
command from 1945 – May 1, 2014. 
 
3.1.2 Visits by foreign leaders  
Presented below are two figures, Figure Q and R. Figure Q presents the number of times a for-
eign leader has visited the United States categorized by originating combatant command from 
1945 to May 1, 2014. Figure R presents the same statistics as Figure Q but in percentages. 
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Figure Q: Visits – The number of times foreign leaders has visited the United States, categorized by originating 
combatant command from 1945 to May 1, 2014 
 
Figure R: Visits – In percentages, the number of times foreign leaders have visited the United States, categorized by 
originating combatant command from 1945 to May 1, 2014 
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3.1.3 U.S Secretary of States’ visits abroad  
Presented below are two figures, Figure S and T. Figure S presents the number of times a United 
States Secretary of State has visited a nation abroad, presented by combatant command from 
1945 to May 5, 2014. Figure T presents the same statistics as Figure S but in percentages.  
 
Figure S: Travels – The number of times a U.S. Secretary of State has visited and area within each combatant com-
mand from 1945 to May 5, 2014. 
 
Figure T: Travels – In percentages, the number of times a U.S. Secretary of State has visited an area within each 
combatant command from 1945 to May 5, 2014. 
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3.1.4 Summary of the findings regarding travels and visits    
The data presented in previous three subchapters does not take into account in which setting, 
length of visit or the subject that the data represents, rather it only includes who travelled where 
and/or who visited. This can be a subject for criticism, illustrated by the complaints of several 
Asian nations during the George W. Bush administration.
83
 The Asian nations felt neglected and 
overlooked as the administration primarily focused on terrorism rather than economic issues, 
which the Asian nations wanted. Regarding the speeches previously analyzed, it should be no-
ticed that there is no maximum amount of travels or visits possible per year.  
   
Still, the historical trend is quite clear in all data presented that travels to or visits from the Eura-
sian continent are generally most favored outside the Northern Command.
84
 In a historical per-
spective, the amount of travel to and number of official visits from the European Command is 
still generally highest, both in number and percent with only a few exceptions.  
 
Regarding the debate of rebalancing, three conclusions can be presented. First of all, both the 
amount of travel and number of official visits per year have increased from the beginning of the 
period studied to the present, especially since the beginning of the 1990s. This observation gives 
validity to the debate about the attention of the United States being scattered in more and more 
areas.  
 
Second, a slight but detectable general trend of focusing away from the European Command and 
toward all other commands started in the mid- to end of the 1990s.  However, this trend can be 
argued to have reversed more recently (i.e. toward a more European Command-oriented focus) at 
the expense of all other combatant commands.  
 
                                                 
83
 Bader 2012: 2 
84
 With the remark that the geographical area of Eurasia is not fully compatible with the European and Pacific 
Commands as elaborated in chapter 2.1 
  Page 55 
(134) 
   
 
 
   
 
 
Third, regarding the time period since the latest debate started in 2011, the number of Presiden-
tial travels has been reduced heavily during the first Obama administration began in 2009. The 
percent of Presidential travels to the Pacific Command increased during 2010 and 2011, but it 
has thereafter decreased. The same pattern can be found in the Secretary of State travels as in 
foreign leader visits. There is no trend supporting that the attention paid to the Pacific Command 
has been increased in favor of European Command, but rather nearly the opposite is likely the 
case as concluded above.  
 
An argument criticizing the conclusion based on general patterns can be that they are not that 
important; rather, the decision where the President chose to travel when newly elected and with 
which country the first official visit occurred could be considered to be of greater significance. In 
order to identify whether any such patterns can be identified, the same data that was analyzed in 
chapter 3.1.1-3.1.3 was analyzed and is presented in Figure U. The date chosen as the starting 
point for identifying the first travel or incoming visit for each President is the date of inaugura-
tion, which is the day the President was sworn in.
85
  
 
President First travel abroad 
as newly elected 
First incoming visit 
as newly elected 
First travel abroad 
as re-elected 
First incoming 
visit as re-
elected 
Truman  No travels regis-
tered 
NORTHCOM 
 (February 11-13, 
1949) 
N/A N/A 
Eisenhower NORTHCOM 
(October 19, 
1953) 
EUCOM  
(March 25-28, 1953) 
NORTHCOM 
(March 20-24, 
1957) 
CENTCOM 
(January 30 – 
February 8, 
1957) 
Kennedy NORTHCOM 
(May 16-18, 
1961) 
 
EUCOM  
(February 14-15, 
1961) 
 
 
N/A N/A 
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 Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural ceremonies 2013a 
  Page 56 
(134) 
   
 
 
   
 
 
President First travel abroad 
as newly elected 
First incoming visit 
as newly elected 
First travel abroad 
as re-elected 
First incoming 
visit as re-
elected 
Johnson NORTHCOM 
(April 14-15, 
1966) 
AFRICOM (March 
29-31, 1965) 
N/A N/A 
Nixon EUCOM, (Febru-
ary 23-24, 1969) 
AFRICOM (March 
5, 1969) 
EUCOM (May 
31- June 1, 1973) 
EUCOM (Feb-
ruary 1-2, 
1973) 
Ford NORTHCOM 
(October 21, 
1974) 
CENTCOM (March 
12, 1974) 
N/A N/A 
Carter EUCOM (May 5-
10, 1977) 
NORTHCOM (Feb-
ruary 14-16, 1977) 
N/A N/A 
Reagan NORTHCOM 
(March 10-11, 
1981) 
SOUTHCOM (Janu-
ary 27-29, 1981) 
NORTHCOM 
(March 17-18, 
1985) 
SOUTHCOM 
(January 31-
february 3, 
1985 
G.H.W. Bush NORTHCOM 
(February 10, 
1989) 
PACOM (February 
1-3, 1989) 
N/A N/A 
Clinton NORTHCOM 
(April 3-4, 1993) 
NORTHCOM (Feb-
ruary 4-5, 1993) 
EUCOM (March 
20-21, 1997) 
SOUTHCOM 
(February 3, 
1997) 
G.W. Bush NORTHCOM 
(February 16, 
2001) 
NORTHCOM (Feb-
ruary 4-5, 2001) 
EUCOM (Febru-
ary 20-23, 2005) 
EUCOM (Feb-
ruary 8-9, 
2005) 
Obama NORTHCOM 
(February 19, 
2009) 
PACOM (February 
24, 2009) 
EUCOM (March 
20-22, 2013) 
EUCOM (Feb-
ruary 2, 2013) 
 Figure U: Statistics of travels and incoming visits for elected and re-elected Presidents 1945-2012
86
 
  
No major conclusion can be drawn from the Figure U except that travels to or visitors from the 
countries within the Northern Command are most common. No increase in focus on or change of 
paid attention toward the Pacific Command or any other combatant command can be identified. 
 
                                                 
86
 Note that President Carter was incorporated in the matrix even though he was sworn in, not elected.  
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In conclusion, no degree of a rebalancing toward the Pacific Command can be identified using 
this indicator. A high degree of attention can be seen in 2011 throughout the indicators, but it has 
returned to normal levels since 2012-2013.   
   
3.2 Deployment of military personnel  
As the commander in chief and in cooperation with Congress, the President of the United States 
decides where U.S. military personnel will be deployed. The United States has had military per-
sonnel stationed worldwide since World War II and, as described in the general introduction, the 
issue of its presence has been generally debated. By analyzing where the military personnel are 
and have been deployed, trends and patterns of the United States’ focus can be concluded.  
 
The Department of Defense’s Human Resource Information publishes a quarterly overview of 
where U.S military personnel and dependents are deployed or stationed. In this thesis, the data 
for September 30 on every fifth year beginning with 1950 have been retrieved and structured into 
each combat command.
87
 The official data presents not only those military personnel deployed to 
each country on a permanent basis, but also how many are deployed in a category called Over-
seas Contingency Operations Commitments, meaning today’s American deployments in Afghan-
istan and Iraq. In order to present both these categories, as it will be of importance for later con-
clusions, four figures are presented, Figures V, W, X and Y. All data are available upon request 
of the author and can also be found at the Norwegian Defense University Library.  
 
The four figures are presented below. The first two, (Figure V and W) present the permanent 
deployed military personnel in actual number per combatant per year; but in Figure W the data is 
compensated for Overseas Contingency Operations. The second two figures (Figure X and Y) 
present the permanent deployed military personnel in percent per combatant command per year, 
but in Figure Y the data is compensated for Overseas Contingency Operations. 
 
                                                 
87
 Department of Defense’s Human Resource Information Source 2014  
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Figure V: Number of deployed military personnel 1950 – 2013, without compensation for overseas commitments 
 
Figure W: Number of deployed military personnel 1950 – 2013, with compensations for overseas commitments 
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Figure X: In percent, number of deployed military personnel 1950 – 2013, without compensations for overseas 
commitments after 2012. 
 
 
Figure Y: In percent, number of deployed military personnel 1950 – 2013, with compensations for overseas com-
mitments 
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Before discussing any conclusions from the findings, some remarks regarding the statistics need 
to be addressed. First, the statistics only reflect the permanent stationing of troops and not the 
temporary stationing of troops, which if included could affect the conclusions. Secondly, the 
category Afloat includes mostly the United States Navy and Marine Corps, but the data cannot be 
categorized into each combatant command as the official data retrieved does not make it possi-
ble. Most of the data in the Afloat category should most likely be categorized within the Northern 
or Pacific Command, less in the Southern and only marginally within the other three combatant 
commands. That means that the actual numbers and percentages presented in the Northern and 
Pacific Commands should have been higher. Third, beginning in 2009 the category Undistribut-
ed includes military personnel deployed in South Korea (20,000 – 40,000 soldiers based on his-
torical data). That means that the Pacific Command should have an additional 20,000 to 40,000 
soldiers added since 2009, which on average equals to 1.4 to 2.9%. Beginning in 2012, the cate-
gory Undistributed includes also part of the number of military personnel participating within the 
operations Enduring Freedom, New Dawn and Iraqi Freedom. The category Undistributed also 
includes military personnel on classified deployments. In the data retrieved the total number of 
military personnel within the Overseas Contingency Operation Deployments is specified and 
shows how many are deployed from the European and the Pacific Commands to the Central 
Command. All Overseas Contingency Operation Deployments are located within the Central 
Command, meaning that in figures Y and Z, the European, Northern and Pacific Commands are 
reduced in total by the same amount as the Central Command is increased. Reducing the column 
Northern Command could possibly be incorrect as some of the reductions should possibly have 
been done within the columns Afloat or Undistributed. The consequences for this thesis are com-
paratively irrelevant because this thesis focuses mostly on the European and the Pacific Com-
mands.  
 
The data presented in the figures does not state what kind of military personnel are deployed 
within each combatant command, whether they are operational, intelligence, logistic or other 
types of personnel or equipment.   
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The observant reader may notice that the figures include 1953 as well as 2011 to 2013 and not 
just every fifth year. Inclusion of the additional years was made for two reasons: the 1950 data is 
possibly not presented in the same way as data starting in 1953, and the years 2011 to 2013 were 
included because the latest debate surrounding the rebalancing restarted in 2011.    
 
The conclusion based on Figure V to Y will now finally be addressed.  
 
The trend of where the United States deploys military personnel outside the Northern Command 
is clear – Eurasia.88   
 
Historically, the trend of attention is quite clear to present. During the Cold War the main atten-
tion was directed to the European Command with two exceptions, the commitments in Korea 
(1950s), and Vietnam (1960-1970s). It could then easily be concluded that two previous eras of 
rebalancing to the European Command can be identified, first after the Korean War and then 
after the Vietnam War. But if studied more closely, there is no major evidence of troops being 
either increased or decreased in other areas as a consequence of the two wars, except for the 
Northern Command. The meaning of this finding is that it cannot be explained as rebalancing in 
the sense of increasing somewhere equals decreasing somewhere else.  
 
The next major change began in 1985 as general reductions started in both the European and the 
Pacific Commands, but the reduction within the European Command was much higher. The 
number of military deployed personnel within the European Command reached the same level as 
deployed in the Pacific in 1995, and until 2010 the numbers were essentially the same although 
both were decreasing. Since 2010, an increased number of deployed personnel can be seen in the 
Pacific Command, but this increase cannot be concluded as being at the expense of Europe. It 
could, however, be possibly but very weakly correlated to personnel reductions associated with 
the Central Command. The focus on the Central Command during the Kuwait-crisis in 1991, in 
Afghanistan (2001-) and Iraq (2003-) are reflected in the findings. Particularly since 2001, the 
                                                 
88
 With the remark that the geographical area of Eurasia is not fully compatible with the European and Pacific 
Commands as elaborated in chapter 2.1 
  Page 62 
(134) 
   
 
 
   
 
 
attention paid to this command cannot be described as being at the expense on any other combat-
ant command, but instead the total number of troops increased during this timeframe.       
 
On a more overall aggregated level, it is possibly to argue that a rebalancing has occurred at four 
occasions, after the Korean, and Vietnam Wars, in the end and aftermath of the Cold War, and as 
the engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq were heavily reduced. But then, rebalancing does not 
mean at the expense on other combatant commands; instead it means reducing the total number 
of troops to pre-war or even lower levels. Could it be described as a type of war fatigue that re-
curs approximately every 20 years? Can the rebalancing therefore be described as shifting focus 
between different power/strategic systems as discussed in the general introduction? As this is not 
part of the study to analyze, it can be recommended for further studies.   
 
Before presenting the conclusion, let’s return to the debate of a rebalancing to the Pacific that 
restarted in 2011. In the introduction, several future deployment goals of military personal were 
mentioned such as the redeployment of troops from Okinawa (Japan) to Guam (an island in the 
Pacific, defined as United States territory), the rotation of up to 2,500 marines to Australia, the 
maintenance of a substantial presence in South Korea and an increase by the United States Navy 
to increase its focus in the region by basing 60% of its ships there compared to the current 50/50 
split between the Atlantic and the Pacific. All of these changes are to occur within five to ten 
years.
89
 
 
If not thoroughly studied, these goals all could seem quite interesting and strengthen a debate of 
a potential rebalancing toward Asia, but when studied in detail and put in a military context, the 
conclusions become different. The first goal, the redeployment of troops from Japan to Guam, is 
in reality just a rebalancing within the Pacific Command, since both locations are located within 
the same combatant command. The rotation of up to 2,500 marines to Australia can at first 
glance mean an increase of 1.8-2% of the U.S personnel stationed within the Pacific Command. 
But, so far the only change made has been to use personnel from Hawaii for temporary deploy-
                                                 
89
 Panetta 2012 
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ments to Australia, which is also a rebalancing within the Pacific Command.
90
 The substantial 
presence within South Korea has not been quantified and could mean anything from increasing 
the number of military personnel in Korea to a reduction of military personnel overall but keep-
ing the proportion of military personal in Korea on a substantially higher level in comparison to 
other areas inside the Pacific Command. The final statement of increasing the number of ships in 
the Pacific from the current 50/50 split to a 60/40 split in favor of the Pacific Command could 
arguably either already been done or have been completed before it was even stated. Today, 57% 
(eight) of the strategic submarines are permanently based on the West Coast within Northern 
Command (Pacific Ocean), and the other 43% (six) are permanently based on the East Coast 
(Atlantic).
91
 Presented in Figure Z below is the summary of U.S. naval ships’ homeports, accord-
ing to the official U.S. Navy homepage, and categorized per combatant command.
92
 
 
Combatant Command Number of  
ships/ submarines 
In percent, total number 
of ships/submarines 
AFRICOM 0 0.00 
CENTCOM 9 2.29 
EUCOM 1 0.25 
NORTHCOM  
(east coast/ Atlantic) 
115 29.26 
NORTHCOM  
(west coast/ Pacific) 
82 20.87 
PACOM 54 13.74 
SOUTHCOM 0 0.00 
No homeport declared 119 30.28 
Under construction 13 3.31 
Total 393 100 
Figure Z: U.S. Navy ships/submarines homeport’s per Combat Command 
                                                 
90
 The Guardian 2013 
91
 Kristensen & Norris 2013 
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 Department of the Navy (n.d.)  
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When compared, 29.52% of the ships are permanently based in the Atlantic, a number that in-
cludes the ships in the Northern Command that are based on both the East Coast and in the Eu-
ropean Command. If the West Coast fleet and the Pacific Command are added together, 34.61% 
of the ships’ homeports are located in the Pacific. If all other commands are excluded and only 
the ratio between Atlantic and Pacific is counted, the split is 53.97% for the Pacific versus 
46.03% in the Atlantic. In addition, it should be noted that the ships constantly move around, 
which is illustrated by the following point. On October 25, 2013, four of ten U.S. carriers were at 
sea, where two were within the Central Command, one was in the Pacific Command and one in 
the Atlantic (Northern/European Command).
93
 On November 8, 2013, the disposition of carriers 
at sea included two within the Central Command, two within the Pacific Command (one was at a 
Naval visit in Hong Kong) and one was in the Atlantic (Northern/European Command).
94
 In ad-
dition it should be noted that the Panama Canal will be widened and made deeper to allow bigger 
ships to pass through, which includes larger warships than those of today.
95
 This observation 
strengthens the argument that counting ships or aircraft as rebalancing or as a measurement of 
focus are of questionable value, both statistically as well as operationally.
96
 
 
Before making an overall conclusion, it can be noticed that there were no major noticeable 
change of permanent deployment of military personnel as a consequence of the Cuban missile 
crisis in the 1960s, and the percentage of deployed military personnel within the Northern Com-
mand has generally increased since 1990 and even more so since 2010.   
   
To summarize an overall conclusion within this indicator: there have been several shifts of atten-
tion toward the Pacific Command, with the most recent major shift starting in 1985 and ending in 
1995. This shift has been the result of not reducing forces proportionally when compared to the 
                                                 
93
 Department of the Navy 2013a  
94
 Department of the Navy 2013b 
95
 Svenska Dagbladet 2014  
96
 The operational value will not be further discussed but as an example, the cruise missiles onboard ships have 
range’s beyond combatant commands borders, and ships with the AEGIS (Missile-defense-system) are for in-
stance deployed in the European Command (Rota, Spain) for mitigating a threat from North Korea or Iran to-
ward the U.S.    
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European Command, although there has been a minor increase starting in 2010. Therefore, a 
high degree of rebalancing toward the Pacific Command can be concluded during the time peri-
od from 1985 to 1995 while being maintained since then. The declared military deployment 
goals supporting the rebalancing are at best questionable, as shown in the data.       
 
3.3 Infrastructure 
In the introduction of chapter 3.2, deployments of military personnel were stated as being rather 
flexible if the means for transporting and infrastructure for housing is available. The means for 
transport will not be discussed further, but infrastructure will be due to four reasons. First, infra-
structure cannot be described as a flexible, mobile indicator, rather, it is a costly long-term in-
vestment. Second, if the political focus is on a certain area, the infrastructure will be at least 
maintained in order to be of possible future use versus the opposite for areas of lesser interest. 
Third, the presence of military installations or sites are totally different entities and can easily be 
misused in debate if not specified in detail what is actually being debated or compared in order 
not to mislead the observer. An installation or site, which will be addressed later, can be anything 
from a single mast to a full missile test range. Also, the amount of land needs to be considered in 
order to get the full picture. Fourth, the President as the commander in chief has the right to build 
as well as close military installations
97
 but it should be mentioned that the political debate within 
the United States regarding the closure of military installations has been a highly contentious 
issue for decades. The Department of Defense proposed several series of base closures in the 
past, but it was unable to carry out the changes without Congressional approval due to domestic 
politic considerations.
98
 In fiscal year 2015, the Department of Defense has requested for Con-
gress to authorize a new round of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) for FY2017 in order to 
reflect the proposed new force structure.
99
     
 
                                                 
97
 Else 2014 
98
 Twight 1989  
99
 Korb, Hofmann &Blakeley 2014: 15 
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In order to address all this, three different analyses of infrastructure will be presented. To make it 
more readable, the chapter is divided into four parts: first an introduction with general remarks, 
followed by data presented in three subchapters, number of installations or sites, chapter 3.3.1, 
owned or rented acres, chapter 3.3.2, and ending with military construction funding, chapter 
3.3.3. Each subchapter contains conclusions of the findings.  
   
Infrastructure can either be owned or leased by the United States, or it can be made available 
through agreements with other nations through so-called host nation support. In this thesis, only 
sites, installations and acreage owned and/or leased by the United States Department of Defense 
has been studied, which excludes those properties loaned or made available to the United States 
by other agreements.  
 
All data are compiled from official United States documents and categorized into each combat-
ant command. The ambition was to study each five-year timeframe during the whole time period 
from 1945 to 2014, with higher emphasis placed upon each year from 2010-2014. For multiple 
reasons, the ambition was not met as all data was not available,
100
 and as will be presented, the 
available data was not possible to analyze. The data used for analyzing the number of sites and 
installations and owned acres are retrieved from the United States Defense Department’s formal 
reports to Congress for Fiscal Year’s 1980, 1983, 1989, 1991, 1993, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2007, 
2012 and 2013.
101
 Unfortunately, data prior to FY 1980 has only been collected and presented in 
a more general method. It should be mentioned that comparison between different years in the 
figures below is difficult since the data have different criteria, an area that will be further dis-
cussed.   
 
The data counted for analyzing Military Construction Funding have been retrieved from the Na-
tional Defense Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2011, 2012, 
                                                 
100
 Due to budget and time constrains for the production of the thesis as several weeks of studies would have been 
needed in Washington. 
101
 Department of Defense 1979; 1982; 1989; 1990; 1992; 1999, 2001a; 2001b; 2006; 2011a; 2012a     
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2013, 2014 and 2015.
102
 The data for all years includes US National Security Authorization Act 
Division B – Military Construction Authorization. Meanwhile Family Housing, Chemical De-
militarization Construction Defense, U.S. Department of Energy National Security Programs and 
funding for constructions within overseas contingency operations have not been included. All 
data are available upon request of the author and can also be found at the Norwegian Defense 
University Library. 
 
3.3.1 Number of installations or sites 
In this chapter, the number of United States Department of Defense sites and installations will be 
analyzed, starting with some explanations and definitions. Using the statistics without under-
standing the differences of how the data are presented can easily lead to misunderstandings or 
misinterpretations. In the data studied, there are major differences in the way it is presented by 
the United States Department of Defense. The major difference is a shifting focus between pre-
senting installations or sites. In the FY 2013 Base Structure Report, the following definitions are 
used to explain the differences between: 
– Site: Physical (geographic) location that is or was owned by, leased to, or otherwise 
possessed by a DoD Component. Each site is assigned to a single installation. A site may 
exist in one of three forms: land only – where no facilities are present; facility or facilities 
only - where there the underlying land is neither owned nor controlled by the government, 
and land with facilities – where both are present. 
– Installation: A military base, camp, post, station, yard, center, homeport facility for 
any ship, or other activity under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense, including 
leased space, that is controlled by, or primarily supports DoD’s activities. An installation 
may consist of one or more sites, or may be an administrative designation.
103
 
 
As will be seen in the figures to come, some reports focus on installations, but there are still dif-
ferent ways of presenting installations. For instance, in the reports for FY1980 and FY1983, the 
                                                 
102
 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year xx - 1989; 1994, 1999, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014  
103
 Department of Defense 2012a:  DoD 3-4 
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focus was on presenting principal installations and associated properties of importance.
104
 The 
summary of the years 1957 to 1974 only presents major military installations,
105
 while the report 
for FY1989 presents installations based on the following criteria: “All bases with more than 300 
full-time civilians are included because that is the threshold for congressional notification of base 
closure in section 2687 of the Title 10, United States Code. For the most part, training and bomb-
ing ranges, communication sites, Reserve Centers, outlying landing fields, and other, often un-
manned, properties are not included in this Report.”106 
  
Even if different in form, the data will be presented since the conclusion addresses an issue of 
relevance for this thesis which will be discussed in the conclusion of this chapter. Even if the 
focus of presenting sites or installations has changed over the years, the Department of Defense 
has stated the total number of installations or sites officially possessed in its official reports. 
These data for the period FY1980 – FY 2013 are presented in Figure AA.  
    
Report Number of sites Number of Installations 
FY 1980 5672  
FY 1983 5523  
FY 1989 5539 618 
FY 1991 5502 631 
FY 1993 5427 569 
FY 1999 Not stated  
FY 2001 6067 (calculated)  
FY 2002 6425  
FY 2007 5311  
FY 2012 5212  
FY 2013 5059 523 
Figure AA: Number of officially-claimed United States military sites from FY 1980 – FY 2013.
107
  
                                                 
104
 Department of Defense 1979: 4; 1982: 4  
105
 General Accounting Office 1980 
106
 Department of Defense 1989: 2 
107
 References to column sites: Department of Defense 1979: 13; 1982: 13; 1989: 6; 1990: 5; 1992: 8; 2001b: 2; 
2006: DoD-6; 2011a: DoD-7; 2012a: DoD-17. References to column installations: Department of Defense 
1989:7;  1990: 29, 51, 78 & 107 (by adding the numbers); 1992: 6; 2012a: DoD-4     
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In conclusion, the number of sites reduced/closed from FY 1980 until the present is 613, which 
equals a reduction of 10.8%.  Since FY 1989, this total reduction of installations stands at 95, 
equaling 15.4%. Needless to say, the statistics do not show whether even more sites/installations 
were closed but replaced by new ones, and they do not reveal any operational effects that could 
be classified as either positive or negative. It could also be true, for example, that two 
sites/installations containing older technology were replaced with one newer, more capable 
site/installation. A theoretical example could be a switchboard, which previously needed person-
nel for manual handling of telephone calls. These people would have required infrastructure sup-
port to provide housing, dining and recreation facilities, etc., whereas those same personnel to-
day have been replaced by a completely automatic switchboard.     
 
Continuing with the analysis of comparing different numbers of sites and installations, a graph-
ical display comparing the data would be misleading as the definitions have changed. Therefore, 
matrixes with raw numbers presenting the data per year per combatant command will be present-
ed and discussed, followed by the same data in percentage form. All data have been retrieved 
from the reports previously mentioned and categorized into each combatant command, if not 
stated otherwise.   
 
Presented are two figures, Figure BB and CC, showing a historical development of the number 
of major military installations possessed from 1957 to 1978. Figure BB shows the number of 
major military installations in the continental United States, while Figure CC shows the total 
major military installations in United States’ territories and in foreign countries. 
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Figure BB: Total major military installations in the continental United States, 1957 – 1978108 
 
Figure CC: Total major military installations in United States’ territories and in foreign countries, 1957 - 1974109 
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 General Accounting Office 1980: enclosure II, page 2 
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 General Accounting Office 1980: enclosure III, page 3 
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Presented below are two figures, DD and EE. Figure DD presents the number of installa-
tions/sites per combatant command FY1980-FY2013, while Figure EE presents the distribution 
in percentages per combatant command. The column total in Figure DD should be compared 
with Figure AA before drawing any conclusions. 
 
Number of installations/sites per combatant command 
 
AFRI- CENT- EU- NORTH- PA- SOUTH- Total 
FY 1980 0 0 226 814 117 17 1174 
FY 1983 0 0 237 884 151 8 1280 
FY 1989 0 0 88 458 68 4 618 
FY 1993 0 0 58 462 44 5 569 
FY 1999 1 5 539 2799 281 28 3653 
FY 2001 1 7 528 5214 297 20 6067 
FY 2002 1 5 534 5224 295 21 6080 
FY 2007 3 18 533 4361 371 25 5311 
FY 2012 2 20 406 4376 386 22 5212 
FY 2013 2 20 343 4284 386 24 5059 
Figure DD: The number of installations/sites per combatant command 
 
Installations/sites in comparison in percent per combatant command 
 
AFRI- CENT- EU- NORTH- PA- SOUTH- Total 
FY 1980 0.00 0.00 19.25 69.34 9.97 1.45 100 
FY 1983 0.00 0.00 18.52 69.06 11.80 0.63 100 
FY 1989 0.00 0.00 14.24 74.11 11.00 0.65 100 
FY 1993 0.00 0.00 10.19 81.20 7.73 0.88 100 
FY 1999 0.03 0.14 14.75 76.62 7.69 0.77 100 
FY 2001 0.02 0.12 8.70 85.94 4.90 0.33 100 
FY 2002 0.02 0.08 8.78 85.92 4.85 0.35 100 
FY 2007 0.06 0.34 10.04 82.11 6.99 0.47 100 
FY 2012 0.04 0.38 7.79 83.96 7.41 0.42 100 
FY 2013 0.04 0.40 6.78 84.68 7.63 0.47 100 
Figure EE: In percent, a comparison per combatant command of installations/sites 
 
It is difficult to reach any conclusions based on the historical data from FY 1980 to FY 1999 
because they are based on different data definitions. On one hand, it could show a major reduc-
tion in the European Command in comparison to the other combatant commands, but on the oth-
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er hand, the comparison cannot be considered valid because of the fundamental differences of 
the data.  
 
However, four valid conclusions for the period FY 2001 to FY 2013 are possible as this data is 
based on the same definitions.  
 
First, the overall attention given outside the Northern Command is toward Eurasia.
110
  
 
Second, the European and Northern Commands have been reduced since FY2002, the African 
and Southern Commands more or less remained the same, while the Central and even more so 
the Pacific Commands have increased in actual numbers. The same patterns are found if the per-
centage is studied but with one exception--the Northern Command is increasing.  
 
Third, the United States has sites/installations in more combatant commands than ever before.  
 
Fourth, the pivot or rebalancing toward the Pacific Command can be argued to have started in 
FY 2001 (if not earlier) and has simply been maintained since the statements by President 
Obama and Secretary of State Clinton in 2010.     
 
So, in conclusion a high degree of rebalancing can be identified starting in FY 2001 and main-
tained since.  
 
3.3.2 Owned or rented land  
As a complement to the number of installations or sites analyzed in the previous chapter, the 
total amount of owned or rented land has also been analyzed within the indicator of infrastruc-
ture.  
 
                                                 
110
 With the remark that the geographical area of Eurasia is not fully compatible with the European and Pacific 
Commands as elaborated in chapter 2.1 
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Figure FF shows a compilation of the total amount of owned or rented land in acres as stated by 
the Department of Defense in official reports to the United States Congress. 
 
Fiscal Year Total number of acres 
FY 1980 26 704 000  
FY 1983 26 663 000  
FY 1989 26 986 000  
FY 1991 26 580 000  
FY 1993 27 453 000  
FY 1999 27 794 232 (calculated) 
FY 2001 30 501 271 (calculated) 
FY 2002 32 108 341 (calculated) 
FY 2007 32 408 262  
FY 2012 28 532 422  
FY 2013 27 716 803  
Figure FF: The total amount of owned or rented acres FY 1980-FY2013
111
 
 
By studying Figure FF, it can be concluded that the total number of owned or rented acres has 
increased by 1,012,803 acres (equaling 4.8%) since FY 1980.  Since FY2007, the total number 
has been steadily decreasing.  
 
Figures GG and HH show the number of acres owned or leased by the United States Department 
of Defense per combatant command and a comparison in percentage form per combatant com-
mand. The column “Missing” shows in percentages how many acres are missing, or as in one 
case, actually shows more than the officially reported number compared to the officially stated 
number of acres shown in Figure FF. 
  
                                                 
111
 Department of Defense 1979: 14; 1982: 14;1989: 6; 1990: 5 the last three digits could be wrong, bad copy; 
1992:8; 2006: DoD-17; 2011a: DoD-19; 2012a: DoD-14. Department of Defense 1999; 2001a; 2001b, all own 
calculations   
  Page 74 
(134) 
   
 
 
   
 
 
Total number of acres rented or owned 
 
AFRI- CENT- EU- NORTH- PA- SOUTH- Total 
Missing  
in  % 
FY 1980 0 0 160 799 24 400 942 705 796 94 417 25 361 954 -5 
FY 1983 0 0 970 633 26 392 213 551 794 95 528 28 010 168 +5 
FY 1989 0 0 876 082 20 331 812 442 899 70 247 21 721 040 -19 
FY 1993 0 0 581 683 14 552 752 321 270 109 606 15 565 311 -43 
FY 1999 3857 9039 467 758 26 873 860 333 405 106 270 27 794 232 0 
FY 2001 3856 9039 424 993 29 507 120 526 522 29 741 30 501 271 0 
FY 2002 3856 9039 533 208 31 011 663 521 383 29 192 32 108 341 0 
FY 2007 3856 34 012 431 844 31 406 241 502 591 29 722 32 408 266 0 
FY 2012 3463 9131 410 045 27 612 153 468 464 29 163 28 532 419 0 
FY 2013 3463 9134 405 267 26 793 520 475 698 29 720 27 716 802 0 
Figure GG: Total amount of owned or leased acres per combatant command
112
 
 
Percent of acres owned or rented 
 
AFRI- CENT- EU- NORTH- PA- SOUTH- Total 
FY 1980 0,00 0,00 0,63 96,21 2,78 0,37 100 
FY 1983 0,00 0,00 3,47 94,22 1,97 0,34 100 
FY 1989 0,00 0,00 4,03 93,60 2,04 0,32 100 
FY 1993 0,00 0,00 3,74 93,49 2,06 0,70 100 
FY 1999 0,01 0,03 1,68 96,69 0,38 1,20 100 
FY 2001 0,01 0,03 1,39 96,74 1,73 0,10 100 
FY 2002 0,01 0,03 1,66 96,58 1,62 0,09 100 
FY 2007 0,01 0,10 1,33 96,91 1,55 0,09 100 
FY 2012 0,01 0,03 1,44 96,77 1,64 0,10 100 
FY 2013 0,01 0,03 1,46 96,67 1,72 0,11 100 
Figure HH: In percentage form, amount of owned or leased acres per combat command
113
 
 
Once again, the data is not totally comparable. The historical data from FY 1980 – FY 1999 does 
not reflect the total quantity of acres presented in Figure GG. For example, the FY 1980 data for 
the European Command does not include acres owned or leased in Germany.
114
 Another im-
portant fact regarding the European Command is that the largest land possession is Thule Air 
                                                 
112
 The CENTCOM FY 2007 figure cannot be explained. Does not affect the conclusions.  
113
 The CENTCOM FY 2007 figure cannot be explained. Does not affect the conclusions.  
114
 Department of Defense 1979 
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Base, Greenland, which covers 233 034 acres – 58% of the total acreage owned or rented in all 
of the European Command FY 2013.
115
    
 
Still, two valid conclusions can be made for the period FY2001 to FY2013. First, the overall 
focus of the United States outside the Northern Command has been Eurasia.
116
  
 
Second, the total number of acres decreased in all combatant commands except the Central 
Command. If the proportions in percentage are compared, a very slight increase is seen within 
the European, no significant change is seen in the African and Central, and a decrease in the 
Northern and Pacific Commands is observed.  
 
Since the debate restarted in 2011, more attention is paid to the Pacific, especially in the total 
amount but also visible in the percentage comparisons. It should be noticed that the total num-
bers for the European Command have decreased, but its proportion of all acres owned has actual-
ly increased, however slight the increase may be.    
 
So, in conclusion a low degree of rebalancing toward the Pacific Command can be argued start-
ing in 2011.  
 
3.3.3 Military Construction Funding 
In chapter 3.3.1 and 3.3.2, the number of installations or sites and the number of owned or rented 
acres has been discussed. This parameter will discuss whether new investments are made in in-
stallations/sites or acres and how economical investments regarding military construction are 
prioritized between the combatant commands. If a pattern can be identified, it can be argued that 
there is a pivot or rebalancing which has not yet been more than vaguely identified within the 
                                                 
115
 Department of Defense 2012a: DoD-84 
116
 With the remark that the geographical area of Eurasia is not fully compatible with the European and Pacific 
Commands as elaborated in chapter 2.1 
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previous two chapters. However, if no pattern can be identified, it would even more strongly 
support the argument that there has been no change since the debate restarted in 2010.
117
  
 
Two figures, Figure II and JJ, are presented showing the amount of funding for military con-
struction authorized by Congress and signed into law by the President and listed by combatant 
command. Figure FF shows the total amount in United States dollars authorized per combatant 
command, while Figure GG shows a comparison in percentages. As the dollars are shown in 
values unadjusted for inflation each year, a graphical display will not be appropriate.   
 
FY/COM AFRI- CENT- EU- NORTH- PA- SOUTH- UNSPEC- Total US$ 
FY1990 3 500 25 800 209 690 2 934 651 103 190 0 21 540 3298371 
FY1995 0 0 202 383 1 872 173 66 600 0 14 050 2155206 
FY2000 2 150 83 090 81 000 2 925 878 323 160 0 0 3415278 
FY2005 0 0 345 703 3 257 377 493 185 0 107 573 4203838 
FY2010 41 845 292 626 394 092 8 113 040 1 038 040 66 000 200 000 10145643 
FY2011 51 631 466 874 967 778 10 096 890 1 369 428 45 400 1 159 693 14157694 
FY2012 89 499 135 013 908 959 8 585 823 600 859 0 954 687 11274840 
FY2013 0 51 348 921 165 5 388 561 965 917 75 900 886 979 8289870 
FY2014 0 74 400 902 400 5 256 284 1 264 697 0 752 466 8250247 
FY2015 9 923 27 826 391 700 2 396 771 558 087 61 575 38 985 3484867 
Figure II: Amounts in thousands of United States Dollars authorized for military construction per combatant com-
mand 
 
                                                 
117
 Due to mainly economical but also time constrains for producing the thesis, the research had to be limited to 
FY1990-FY2014  
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Figure JJ: In percentages, the authorized budget in US dollars for military construction per combatant command 
 
A few notes regarding the data presented. The data in the figures only shows the authorized 
budget in US dollars for military construction and does not show if or how the money is used. 
The data for FY2015 is only preliminary as the budget is still under negotiation within the Con-
gress, Senate and the Obama administration.  
 
Despite these remarks, some conclusions can be made from the available data before analyzing 
the last implemented action indicator. First, the overall U.S. attention outside the Northern 
Command has been the Eurasia continent.
118
  
 
Second, the armed forces of the United States are investing proportionally less in the Northern 
Command by prioritizing primarily the European and even more so the Pacific Commands. The 
                                                 
118
 With the remark that the geographical area of Eurasia is not fully compatible with the European and Pacific 
Commands as elaborated in chapter 2.1 
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shift toward the Pacific Command can be identified starting in FY1995. The classi-
fied/unspecified investments can possibly support but not discard this trend if and when they 
become declassified.  
 
In conclusion a low degree of rebalancing toward the Pacific Command can be identified, start-
ing in FY1995. 
 
3.4 Distribution of nuclear weapons 
Since their advent in 1945, nuclear weapons, to include both strategic and tactical types, have 
been the most important deterrence and defense capability possessed by the United States.
119
 As 
such, a study of the distribution of nuclear weapons storage facilities and strategic submarine 
fleet patrols would complement previous indicators by adding the President’s prioritization of 
the ultimate political weapon. Furthermore, the political sensitivity of the distribution of nuclear 
weapons considerably strengthens the importance of this indicator as the President needs to bal-
ance political sensitivity with strategic or operational requests.  
 
Of all indicators analyzed in this thesis, this indicator has been the most difficult to collect in 
terms of official data in a format useful for the purpose this thesis. Due to this fact, official doc-
uments have been complemented with data from other scholarly sources. As a consequence, the 
layout of presenting the data differs from other chapters and focus mostly on the European and 
Pacific Commands.  
 
Nuclear weapons can be launched from the ground, the sea or the air within the so-called nuclear 
triad. In this thesis, focus is on the storage area of the weapons and on the strategic submarine 
fleet patrolling patterns. This focus excludes the strategic bomber force disposition of single air-
frames. Of the strategic bombers, the most commonly known is be the B-52 Stratofortress, which 
can reach virtually any location in the world within hours by using air-to-air refueling. Analyzing 
the basing would therefore be of very little to no use. As an example, during the Baltic Approach 
                                                 
119
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Exercise in 2012 (BALTOPS 2012), a B-52 took off from the United States, made a low fly-by 
for very important guests (VIPs) over the coast of Lithuania and then returned to the United 
States the same day.
120
 The point of this example is to stress the importance of studying the stor-
age locations for nuclear weapon rather than individual aircraft because they can easily be 
moved to different locations for arming.          
 
The chapter is divided into three parts, starting with an introduction, continuing with presenting 
data of the nuclear weapon distribution in the European and Pacific Commands (including the 
deterrent strategic submarine patrols) and ending with conclusions.  
 
To present the data on the nuclear weapons distribution, the first figure, KK, shows the total 
number of nuclear warheads in the United States nuclear weapon stockpile from 1945 to 2014.  
 
 
Figure KK: United States Nuclear Stockpile 1945-2014. Data for 2010, 2011 and 2014 missing 
                                                 
120
 Lithuanian Armed Forces 2012 
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Before drawing any conclusions, two initial remarks are necessary. First, from a quick glance at 
Figure KK, it appears that the number of nuclear weapon has decreased drastically, but the figure 
does not show the weapons effects or state whether they are strategic (intercontinental missiles) 
or tactical (battlefield used) nuclear weapons. Considering the weapons effects, the figure does 
not show the accuracy of the missiles delivering the nuclear weapons. Today, the probability of 
hitting the intended target is much higher than earlier, meaning that the number of weapons 
could be reduced because the weapons effect of each bomb per intended target is higher. Despite 
this remark, the nuclear weapons during each historical time period have been viewed as state of 
the art and have been planned to be used in accordance with this belief. Second, the data used for 
compiling Figure KK are official documents released by the Unites States Departments of Ener-
gy and Defense and more recent data from other scholars.
121
 It should be noted that in an Ameri-
can document previously classified as top secret, the data for the years 1948 to 1959 differs.
122
 
For the conclusions in this thesis, the differences in the data do not have a major impact. 
 
The chapter will continue with first a discussion of land-based nuclear disposition within the 
European Command (Figure LL and MM), followed by the Pacific Command (Figure NN and 
OO) and then nuclear weapons afloat (Figure PP). Before summarizing the findings, the pattern 
of strategic submarine patrols will be presented (Figure QQ).   
 
Starting with Figure LL, the number of United States nuclear weapons in the European Com-
mand 1954 to the present is shown. 
                                                 
121
 For the period 1945 to 1962: Department of Energy (n.d.);  For the period 1962 to 2009: Department of Defense 
2010; Data for 2010, 2011 and 2014 missing;  Data for 2012 and 2013: Kristensen & Norris 2013 
122
 Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense 1980: 55  
  Page 81 
(134) 
   
 
 
   
 
 
 
Figure LL: The number of United States nuclear weapons in EUCOM, 1954 to 2011
123
 
 
 
Figure MM: Atlantic Deployment On Shore 1961 – 1977
124
 
                                                 
123
 Kristensen & Norris 2010: 65 
124
 Norris, Arkin & Burr 1999: 32. Originally: Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense 1980: 181   
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The two figures, LL and MM, show that a reduction in number of weapons has been made within 
the European Command, and only a very limited number of nuclear weapons remains today. 
According to official data, the number of non-strategic nuclear weapons remaining in the Euro-
pean Command today
125
 includes 150-200 B-61 tactical nuclear weapons, which are the so-
called NATO nuclear weapons.
126
 It is unclear whether the data within Figure MM is already 
accounted for in Figure LL. Irrespective of whether it is included or not, the conclusion will still 
be valid as the weapons presented in Figure MM belonging to the European Command are with-
drawn.    
 
Before discussing nuclear weapons ashore within the European Command, the following two 
figures, Figure NN and Figure OO, will present the number of nuclear weapons within the Pacif-
ic Command.  
 
Figure NN: Number of nuclear weapons within the Pacific Command ashore
127
 
                                                 
125
 NATO 2012  
126
 Kristiansen 2010  
127
 Norris, Arkin & Burr 1999: 30. Originally: Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense 1980: 180 
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The figure shows that in 1977, nuclear weapons remained in storage in Guam and Korea. In Fig-
ure LL, the reduction in South Korea is visible.  
 
 
Figure OO: United States Nuclear Weapons in South Korea 1950 – 2000
128
 
 
Before commenting on Figure OO or making further conclusions about Figure LL and MM, Fig-
ure PP will be presented showing the nuclear weapons deployed at sea from 1961 to 1977.  
  
                                                 
128
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Figure PP: United States Nuclear deployments as sea 1961 to 1977
129
 
 
Before drawing conclusions from the figures presented, some additional remarks regarding the 
data will need to be addressed. The numbers presented in Figure PP will be added to the total 
amount in previous figures for the European and Pacific Commands. In the figure presenting the 
US Nuclear Weapons in South Korea (Figure OO), the note in the bottom right-hand corner re-
fers to this Presidential decision in 1991 to:  
 
eliminate its entire worldwide inventory of ground-launched short-range, that is, 
theater nuclear weapons. We will bring home and destroy all of our nuclear artil-
lery shells and short-range ballistic missile warheads. We will, of course, ensure 
that we preserve an effective air-delivered nuclear capability in Europe.
130
 
 
                                                 
129
 Norris, Arkin & Burr 1999: 30. Originally: Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense 1980: 182 
130
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The Pacific Command Commander’s history dated 1991 states that the transfer of all tactical 
nuclear weapons was to be started before the end of 1991. The document further reveals that the 
total number of weapons concerned was over 2,000 and that ships with homeports outside the 
continental United States were to remove the weapons as time and location permitted.
131
    
 
As the tactical nuclear weapons were to be removed, the commander of the Pacific Command 
wrote that the strategic nuclear weapons will continue to have a decisive role as deterrent weap-
ons. One of the strategic weapons, strategic submarines, and their patrols will be the last figure 
presented in this chapter. In Figure QQ the number of strategic submarine deterrent patrols 1960 
to 2012 are presented.    
  
 
Figure QQ the number of strategic submarine deterrent patrols 1960 to 2012
132
 
 
The conclusion drawn from Figure QQ is that the European Command was prioritized during the 
Cold War, but a substantial reduction in the number of patrols occurred starting 1991. At the 
same time, the number of patrols in the Pacific remained the same. During the 1991 to 1999 
timeframe, the number of patrols was essentially the same with some small variations in the Eu-
                                                 
131
 Commander in Chief United States Pacific Command 1991: 90-92 
132
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ropean Command. Since 2006, the Pacific Command has seen more patrols than the European 
Command, and the pattern until 2012 showed a decreased focus on the European Command in 
favor or the Pacific Command. 
 
After presenting figures LL to QQ with additional remarks and conclusions, the overall conclu-
sions for the chapter concerning the disposition of nuclear weapons of the United States within 
the European and the Pacific Command will be addressed.  
 
First, from the data available and presented, it appears that the main focus of the United States 
nuclear presence outside the Northern Command has been within the Eurasian continent.
133
  
 
Second, the nuclear weapons were prioritized within the European Command during the Cold 
War, but since the 1990s have been prioritized within the Pacific Command on an operational 
level. On a more political level, it can be argued that the priority remains within the European 
Command, as it is the only combatant command that still has (or at least officially has) tactical 
nuclear weapons remaining outside the United States.
134
 Such an argument is not new and has 
been stated before by other scholars.
135
  
 
Third, in regard to the current debate that restarted in 2010, no data can be found supporting a 
new or resumed rebalancing toward the Pacific Command in favor of the European Command, 
as the major rebalancing concluded occurred in the 1990s and regained momentum in 2005.    
 
                                                 
133
 With the remark that the geographical area of Eurasia is not fully compatible with the European and Pacific 
Commands as elaborated in chapter 2.1 
134
 Questions can be raised about for instance Canada (Figure MM) or Guam (Figure NN). As Guam is United State 
territory the conclusion can still be valid for the European and Pacific Commands.   
135
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In addition, it should be noticed that in 1994 the United States officially announced that no stra-
tegic nuclear weapons were aimed at the former Soviet Union,
136
 but it waited until 1997 before 
making the same announcement regarding China.
137
       
 
In conclusion, a high degree operational rebalancing toward the Pacific Command can be identi-
fied starting in the mid-1990s.  
  
3.5 Summary of the findings of the implemented action indicators 
In this chapter four implemented actions indicators have been analyzed in order to be able to 
answer the second research question – Which patterns or trends can be identified within the 
United States implemented actions to support a rebalancing toward Asia? The chapter will start 
by summarizing the findings of the indicators studied, answer the second research question and 
conclude with a general discussion before turning to the overall conclusions and consequences 
for Europe in chapter four.  
 
Five general findings will be discussed as a summary of the findings and conclusions within the 
studied indicators, which will lead to the answer of the first research question.  
  
First, the main focus of all four analyzed indicators outside the Northern Command has been on 
the Eurasian continent.
138
 
 
Second, three
139
 of the indicators show a pattern where the United States’ attention is more scat-
tered amongst all combatant commands than previously.  
 
                                                 
136
 Clinton 1994 
137
 The White House 1998: 44 
138
 With the remark that the geographical area of Eurasia is not fully compatible with the European and Pacific 
Commands as elaborated in chapter 2.1 
139
 All indicators except Distribution of nuclear weapons, which is not possible to include as the data does not cover 
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Third, the results from the four indicators analyzed do not align themselves into a single and dis-
tinct pattern regarding a rebalancing toward the Pacific. Three of the indicators – the deployment 
of military personnel, military infrastructure and the dispersal of nuclear weapons – indicate a 
recent high degree of a rebalancing toward the Pacific Command starting in 1985 and ending in 
1995, with minor increases in 2001 and 2005 and still maintained today. Meanwhile, one indica-
tor – travels and visits – shows at least a maintained focus on the European Command if not in 
fact an increased focus.    
 
Fourth, one indicator, the deployment of military personnel, shows a generally increased focus 
on the Northern Command in recent years at the expense of the other combatant commands, 
while the indicator of infrastructure shows the opposite, especially concerning authorized fund-
ing. This last indicator can be argued to support a more flexible U.S. approach for having troops 
“back at home” and being able to send them to locations when needed or at least deploy them 
from the European and Pacific Commands.  
 
Fifth, the announced changes by the Department of Defense concerning deployment of U.S. per-
sonnel to support the rebalancing toward Asia seems to be more of a rebalancing within the Pa-
cific Command than a rebalancing to the Pacific Command. This conclusion will be put in con-
text with the recent development within the European Command as a response to the crises in 
Syria as well as in Ukraine. As a response to a Turkish request to NATO, the United States de-
ployed Patriot missiles batteries in Turkey
140
 that were normally based in the Northern Com-
mand. Perhaps coincidentally, the U.S. deployed battle tanks to the European Command as a 
response to the ongoing crises in Ukraine almost at the same time.
141
 Other military responses to 
the Ukraine crisis have been, at least initially, rebalances within the European Command by de-
ploying U.S. F-15s from England to the Baltic States,
142
 U.S. F-16s from Italy to Poland,
143
 and 
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 United States European Command (n.d.); NATO 2013 
141
 Darnell 2014 
142
 Svan & Vandiver 2014 
143
 Ibid. 
  Page 89 
(134) 
   
 
 
   
 
 
deploying 600 U.S. soldiers from Italy to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland.
144
 An important 
factor regarding the current Ukraine-crises is also that the Europeans are not the only ones 
watching the United States’ reactions-- most Asian countries are doing the same. This interest is 
due to the fact that sovereignty is a sensitive issue in most Pacific countries, and therefore the 
American response is interesting to follow for both potential adversaries along with friends and 
allies.
145
  
 
So, the answer to the second research question - Which patterns or trends can be identified with-
in the United States implemented actions to support a rebalancing toward Asia? – based on stated 
preconditions is: A high degree of a military rebalancing toward the Pacific Command can be 
identified, starting in 1985 ending in 1995 and at the present it is simply being maintained. There 
is no general empirical evidence to support a rebalancing at the expense of the European Com-
mand. 
 
The conclusion of a high degree of a rebalancing of military personnel did not happen secretly, 
but possibly it just went unnoticed.  
 
“Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has significantly reduced the level of 
U.S. military forces stationed in Europe. We have determined that a force of roughly 
100,000 U.S. military personnel assigned to U.S. European command will preserve U.S 
influence and leadership in NATO […] In thinking about Asia, we must remember that 
security comes first. The United States intends to remain active in that region. We are a 
Pacific nation…Currently our forces number nearly 100,000 personnel in this critical re-
gion.”146 
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4 Conclusions and consequences for Europe 
As this thesis was written, the crisis in Ukraine emerged and revitalized the discussion of the 
United States’ attention toward Europe and consequently even further deepened the latest debate 
from 2011 of a rebalancing or pivot toward Asia. The purpose of this thesis has been to contrib-
ute to this debate by as objectively as possible describing the United States’ political and military 
attention given to areas outside the continental United States by the President of the United 
States over a long time period. By using this approach, the aim of the thesis can be fulfilled– to 
what degree the United States is rebalancing toward Asia and to discuss what implications it has 
for Europe. 
 
This chapter is divided into four parts. It starts with an introduction and continues in chapter 4.1 
with combining and discussing the conclusion on research questions one and two, presented in 
chapters two and three and thus addressing the first part of the overall aim of the thesis – To what 
degree United States is rebalancing toward Asia? It continues in chapter 4.2 with discussing the 
overall findings implications for Europe and thereafter answers both the third research question – 
in what way can European security be affected by a potential United States’ rebalancing toward 
Asia? – and the second part of the aim of the thesis - to discuss what implications it has for Eu-
rope. The chapter ends with an overall summary that addresses the general conclusions of the 
thesis, both in regard to actual findings as well as the theory and method used in chapter 4.3. 
 
4.1 Conclusion - To what degree the United States is rebalancing toward Asia 
Starting with the question – To what degree the United States is rebalancing toward Asia? 
 
The answer to this question will be possible to conclude when combining the answers within the 
Declaratory Policies and Implemented Actions indicators studied and by adding remarks and 
comments. When combined, a more comprehensive understanding of the United States’ politics 
can be described in the conclusion.       
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 The following four combined conclusions can be presented as a summary of the answers to re-
search questions one and two, presented in chapter two and three.  
 
First, the main attention paid by the United States outside the Northern Command during the 
entire time period studied has been toward the Eurasian continent. The main focus of attention 
has been the European Command, followed by the Pacific and Central Commands and then mar-
ginally the Africa and Southern Commands, with a few minor exceptions. This conclusion em-
phasizes the theoretical discussion of the United States’ continued will of balancing the Eurasian 
powers, even though the chosen form of comparing data (the combatant commands) are not fully 
compatible with the definition of Eurasia.   
 
Second, the attention given toward other areas than the European and Pacific Commands has 
increased since the end of the Cold War, meaning that the United States’ attention is more scat-
tered over the world than ever before. This point leads up to a discussion of a potential over-
stretching of the United States’ resources.    
 
Third, throughout the time period studied, several shorter but major increases in attention can be 
identified, especially in the Pacific and Central Commands. These increases have always been in 
conjunction with major historical events such as the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the first Iraq 
War in 1991, and the more recent conflicts in Afghanistan (2001-) and Iraq (2003-). But within 
the studied indicators, there are no clear patterns or trends indicating that the increased attention 
given has been at the expense of other combatant commands. This could be the result of the cho-
sen approach of using a mixed method for analyzing the indicators since the statistical data may 
not lead to conclusive evidence, but the added qualitative remarks have indicated that the in-
creased focus could have been perceived as decreasing the focus on other combatant commands. 
As one example, many Asian countries felt overlooked or neglected during the 2000s.
147
  But on 
the other hand, it can be argued that this perception by Asian countries does not mean less atten-
tion is given by the United States to the Pacific Command per se, only that the type of attention 
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from the U.S. was not the type wanted by the Asian countries. Such a case could be described as 
a conflict of interest rather than of a level of attention. 
 
Fourth and lastly, the discussion of a rebalancing needs to be divided into long-, short- and very 
short-term perspectives as shown in the summary chapter, 2.5 and 3.5. The declaratory policy 
and the implemented actions do not give one single pattern in either perspective, but some com-
monalities can be addressed.  
 
Starting with the long-term perspective beginning in 1945, the declaratory indicators reveal a 
decrease in the attention paid to the European Command.  In this time period, the proportion of 
attention was increased in other combatant commands, whereas it has not been possible to reach 
a long-term conclusion within the implemented actions due to the form of the data available. 
This will be addressed in the later discussion regarding consequences for Europe.  
 
In the short-term perspective, the declaratory policies reveal an increased attention from the Pa-
cific starting in the 1980s and the European in the 1990s in favor of the Central Command, 
whereas the implemented actions reveal a major increase proportionally in attention given to the 
Pacific Command starting in 1985 and ending in 1995, with minor increases starting in 2001 and 
2005. Of course the attention toward the Central Command during the 2000s can be identified, 
but only within a few indicators and it does not interfere with the presented conclusions.  
 
In the very short-term perspective since the debate restarted in 2011, no general rebalancing or 
increased attention given to the Pacific Command can be concluded, but rather almost the oppo-
site. There was increased attention given within the declaratory policies in 2010 and 2011, but in 
2012 and 2013 there was increased attention paid to the European Command. Within the imple-
mented actions, the trend of maintaining the attention established during the time frame since 
1985 can be found, but the flexible indicators support a focus of more attention toward the 
Northern Command while the non-flexible indicators support a focus more within the European 
and Pacific Commands.   
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Before presenting the overall conclusion and then discuss the implications for Europe, some ad-
ditional comments will be presented.  
 
The increase of attention within the declaratory policy toward the Central Command identified 
starting in the 1980s deserves a comment to be put in the proper context. The National Security 
Strategy described the effects of the increased focus within the Central Command as benefitting 
the European and Pacific Commands and subsequently benefitting the United States in the long 
term.  In this manner of thinking, it can also be argued that this strategy led to increased attention 
to the European and Pacific Commands overall by focusing on the Central Command: 
   
The Security of Southwest Asia is inextricably linked to the security of Europe and Japan and 
thus is vital to the defense of the United States. A key peacetime military objective in South-
west Asia is to enhance deterrence by sufficiently improving our global capability to deploy 
and sustain military forces so as to ensure that, if the Soviet Union attacks….148            
 
Another declaratory policy document stated that in 1981, the United States shifted its focus of 
general-purpose peacetime forces from the European and the Pacific Commands to the Central 
Command. In addition, it increased its presence in the Southern Command at the expense of the 
Northern Command.
149
 The debate that restarted in 2011 regarding a rebalancing could therefore 
be discussed as being a rebalancing from the Central Command back to the European and/or the 
Pacific Commands. But if the current reductions of forces in Afghanistan and Iraq are studied 
more closely, such an argument is unfounded for several reasons. First, as shown in the deploy-
ment indicator, the troops are returning to the Northern Command and possibly returning to pre-
2001/2003 numbers in the region. Secondly, the economic support for the overseas contingency 
commitments has been added by Congress, meaning that the Pacific Command has received and 
continues to receive the same proportional level of funding as before, even though it may be 
monetarily less due to further reductions in the United States’ defense budget. Finally, several 
                                                 
148
 The White House 1982: 4. Please note the US State Department definition of the Middle East, Southwest Asia is 
used.   
149
 The White House 1981 
  Page 94 
(134) 
   
 
 
   
 
 
scholars continue to argue for a remained U.S. interest in the Middle East due to several factors 
such as the Israel-Palestine conflict, the developments in Iran and Syria and oil production, just 
to name a few.
150
  
 
Although there was no general conclusion to be drawn within the declaratory indicators stating 
that a rebalancing towards the Pacific Command was found, this finding was the opposite of the 
conclusions drawn regarding implemented actions. Does that imply a diversion between the de-
claratory polices and the implemented actions? If so, it would support further research in line 
with Nitze’s work of exploring the difference between what is stated and what is planned or done 
in reality. For the following reason, this thesis argues that there is not a diversion.  
 
The conclusions presented in the implemented actions chapter have actually been mentioned in 
the declaratory policies documents. For instance, the rebalancing of deployed military personnel 
was addressed already in the State of the Union address in 1990 saying “And so, tonight I am 
announcing a major new step for further reduction in U.S. and Soviet manpower in Central and 
Eastern Europe to 195,000 on each side.”151 It was continued in 1995 by stating “We have de-
termined that a force of roughly 100,000 U.S. military personnel assigned to the U.S. European 
command will preserve U.S. influence and leadership in NATO and provide a deterrent posture 
that is visible to all Europeans”152 and furthermore addressed the numbers in the Pacific by stat-
ing that “currently, our forces number nearly 100,000 personnel in East Asia.”153 It would be 
interesting to elaborate on Berdal’s approach of analyzing different levels within the administra-
tion (discussed regarding the Department of Defense statements in chapter 3.2), but it will not 
further discussed as it is not within the purpose of this thesis. However, it could be recommended 
for further studies.   
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So, as an overall conclusion of the first part of the overall research question - To what degree is 
the United States rebalancing toward Asia – the answer would be: During the time period stud-
ied, the United States has always paid attention to the Pacific Command. Within the declaratory 
polices studied, no degree of rebalancing toward the Pacific Command can be identified, but 
rather the opposite can be noticed within the implemented actions studied. The degree of military 
rebalancing was high from 1985 to 2005, and today it is just maintained with no concrete evi-
dence supporting a restarted rebalancing since 2011.      
 
Since the debate restarted in 2011, the degree of a continued rebalancing toward the Pacific 
Command is marginally present but is difficult to describe as a rebalancing within the political 
and military power systems studied. But is the debate of rebalancing within these two power 
systems possibly the wrong way of addressing the discussion? Could the rebalancing actually be 
from the political and the military systems to other power systems, such as the economic or tech-
nical? Can it possibly be concluded that the rebalancing is occurring within or between these 
other systems or between other actors or indicators? As an example for such a hypothetical ques-
tion, could the political rebalancing have happened in 1972 with the Shanghai Communique,
154
 
could the economic rebalancing have started as the trade was normalized in 1980,
155
 or could the 
military rebalancing have occurred as earlier stated in 1985-2005? This could be the case that is 
described by former National Security Council member Jeffrey Bader, who previously worked 
on President Obama’s Asia policies:  
  
The Asia-Pacific region deserved higher priority in American foreign policy. With wealth, 
and power, and influence gradually shifting from Europe toward Asia in the past several dec-
ades, the region has emerged as the world’s center of gravity for economic, political, and se-
curity decisions in the twenty-first century.
156
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The hypothetical question raised above can be used as inspiration for further research study and 
is possibly what Secretary of State Hillary Clinton meant when she wrote:  
 
One of the most important tasks of the American statecraft over the next decade will 
therefore be to lock in a substantially investment – diplomatic, economic, strategic, and 
otherwise – in the Asia-Pacific region.157       
 
Such a discussion would also be more in line with the political objectives stated by the United 
States State Department presented in the general introduction chapter, as the recently declared 
military goals analyzed in chapter three do not support or refute a rebalancing discussion within 
the military power system.    
  
4.2 Conclusion - Implications for Europe 
After establishing the overall conclusion regarding a rebalancing, this chapter will answer the 
third research question, “In what way is European security affected by a potential United States 
rebalancing toward Asia?” and by doing so fulfill the second part of this aim of the thesis - to 
discuss what implications it has for Europe. 
 
As the conclusion regarding a rebalancing did not show any degree of changes resulting from 
declaratory policies and as the rebalancing of implemented actions occurred mainly 1985 to 2005 
and is merely being maintained today, it would be easy to immediately draw the conclusion that 
there are no current implications for Europe. But is that really the case? 
 
The word used in this thesis is implications not consequences (or any other word for that matter). 
The choice of using the word implications is deliberate because it has a more positive, or at least 
neutral, connotation in comparison to consequences. However, do the implications need to be 
negative as hypothetically questioned when formulating the aim of this thesis?  
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One example of an argued positive effect would be to look at the objectives the United States 
had with the financial aid associated with the Marshall Plan, described by two citations below. 
The first describes the starting point and the second the objectives reached by the United States: 
 
Apart from the above problem of military capabilities, the Western European powers con-
tinue to be confronted with serious political, economic and social problems despite sub-
stantial advances, with U.S. assistance, towards greater stability and cohesion. These 
problems’ have derived from economic conditions, political instability, neutralist tenden-
cies, social tensions, and, in France and Italy, the continued existence of large and power-
ful Communist parties. Although genuine progress has been made, further efforts by the 
Western European countries and U.S. assistance to them will be required to overcome 
these adverse elements and to continue the progress toward political, economic and social 
stability, and collective defense in Western Europe.
158
  
 Reappraisal of United States objectives and strategy for National security 
 
European stability is vital to our own security. Our objective is to complete the construc-
tion of a truly integrated, democratic and secure Europe, with a democratic Russia as a 
full participant. This would complete the mission the United States launched 50 years ago 
with the Marshall Plan and the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO 
remains the anchor of American engagement in Europe and the linchpin of transatlantic 
security. As a guarantor of European democracy and a force for European stability, 
NATO must play the leading role in promoting a more integrated, secure Europe pre-
pared to respond to new challenges. 
A National Security Strategy for a New Century, 1997
159
 
 
From the perspective of the United States, the implication of the two citations can be argued to 
be positive because Europe had become more stable and secure, at least until Syria and even 
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more recently the Ukraine crisis emerged. On the other hand, the implication of reaching the 
objectives can be argued as negative, which can be combined with the conclusion within the 
analyses that there is a less frequent mentioning of Europe and reduced presence of permanently 
deployed military personnel. The reduced attention paid toward Europe can be argued to be a 
way of reducing the importance or value of the European part of the Eurasia continent, as the 
historical ties are weakening and the younger generations of the United States’ population will 
forget their ancestral ties. If the European objective is to remain the most important ally to the 
United States, such a development is negative. But as the crisis in Ukraine has developed, the 
need of the United States to possibly refocus attention on more actions implemented by the mili-
tary will change this trend. But still, the military response to the Ukraine crisis needs to be put in 
perspective, starting with a threat analysis and leading us to reflect upon the previous discussion 
within the geopolitical context of using different tools for different areas/items.  
 
The Director of National Intelligence report to the U.S. Senate from 2013 specifically mentions 
several different threats. The cyber threat mainly referred to Russia and China, the threat from 
terrorism referred mainly to Al-Qaida, Iran and Hezbollah, and other general threats not linked to 
specific actors were transnational organized crime, nuclear proliferation, espionage, continued 
development in space, natural resources (including food, water, minerals, energy and climate 
change), health and pandemic. Regarding the regional threat assessments mentioned, a conven-
tional war between India and China or China’s response to the United States rebalancing toward 
Asia (which includes Chinese military options) are mentioned.
160
 To counter this threat assess-
ment, it is possibly more convenient or suitable to use high-tech equipment stationed within the 
European Command rather than tanks and battle groups. It can also be questioned whether more 
civilians are required than military soldiers, which the indicators analyzed do not reflect. If a 
more high-tech approach is needed, the need for physical, geographic training areas are reduced 
as a cyber exercises most likely require much less exercise space than a brigade exercise with 
full fire support. In reality, the U.S. military presence within the European Command could have 
increased in sectors other than those studied. Such a discussion can be supported in a statement 
by the Department of Defense that the rebalancing is in order to meet a broader spectrum of con-
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flicts, no longer focusing on stability operations but on capabilities needed for the future.
161
 In 
addition to this argument, it could also be the case that the indicators studied do not reflect upon 
how the United States views its need for military presence within each combatant command. 
Possibly, the European Command will be seen as more of a logistical hub connecting the North-
ern Command with the African and Central Commands. Such a discussion or perception could 
be supported by the statement by the Commander of the European Command describing the im-
portance of the location of his command because it is situated along the borders of other combat-
ant commands.
162
 In order to use them when and where required, the mobilization of United 
States forces has been discussed in several of the declaratory documents, which address the need 
for global support, global mobility capability and prepositioning equipment ashore and at sea.
163
 
Global mobility and prepositioning is of importance in order for the U.S. to respond to any threat 
on the Eurasian continent because it needs to pass either the Pacific or the Atlantic Oceans in 
order to reach the Eurasian continent, as seen in Figure A.  
 
As long as the United States is focusing on balancing the power of Eurasia, it can be argued that 
the European Command will not be forgotten and remain a focus of attention since Europe will 
remain a valid and important area for the United States. 
 
Another aspect that is not studied or mentioned is the political and military doctrine. The recent-
ly discussed U.S. military doctrine, the AirSea Battle Concept,
164
 is generally defined as the 
United States’ response to the increased Chinese attention around Taiwan and a major part of the 
United States military pivot or rebalancing toward the Pacific.
165
 An argument that could be 
raised and discussed in later research is whether the mentioned concept or versions adopted lat-
er
166
 can be used toward Russia, the Arctic, the Baltic States or other areas, which consequently 
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strongly influence the development of new NATO concepts and doctrines. In the end, such a 
debate can affect the national defense planning in regards to procurement of new equipment etc.  
 
Another positive implication for Europe and which can be argued to be vital to maintain is actu-
ally the same finding within Implemented Action indicator – travels and visits. The conclusion 
showed that European leaders still have a high degree of attention and by that can influence the 
President of the United States. The negative aspect is that Europe most certainly will need to 
deliver something to maintain this position by satisfying the United States. 
 
So, the effects upon European security can be concluded to already have already happened since 
the focus of implemented actions toward the Pacific occurred long before the most recent debate 
started. During the Cold War, European security relied heavily upon the presence of the United 
States in all dimensions. After the American military withdrawal from Europe during 1980s and 
1990s, Europe tried to fill the gaps through different initiatives such as the European Union, but 
European security is still heavily dependent on the United States as has been shown in Bosnia in 
1995, Kosovo in 1999-2012, Georgia in 2008, Libya in 2011, Syria from 2012- and in the 
Ukraine from 2014-. Therefore, the need of support from the United States, at least within the 
military domain, is present and seems to remain. At the same time, the focus of the United States 
is more geographically scattered than ever before, and as discussed earlier, it needs active Euro-
pean support with common burden sharing.    
 
Because Libya 2011 was mentioned, a final comment will be made before concluding this part of 
the chapter. Before, during and after the war a new a United States policy of “Leading from be-
hind” has been discussed and its implications for Europe.167 As this thesis does not evaluate the 
military operations in Libya in 2011, there will be no discussion of whether “leading from be-
hind” was the correct description versus just “leading.” Instead, it can be recommended as a fu-
ture research topic using the theoretical framework of studying declaratory policies versus im-
plemented actions. One comment relevant for this thesis is that the Libya conflict can be used as 
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a positive example for Europe since numerous countries participated in a coalition and showed 
willingness to actively participate in taking responsibility for security in Europe and it surround-
ing areas. In doing so, Europe demonstrated their capacity and willingness to the United States 
and others.
168
 At the same time, the Libya operation can be argued as being a poor example 
showing the need for the United States continued participation in major military operations as 
Europe lacked most of the capacities. The risk of participating blindly in such operations can be 
discussed; if not the overall geopolitical consequences can be foreseen, risking being a tool used 
by the United States in reaching their national objectives.
169
  
 
So, to answer the third research questions – in what way is European security affected by a po-
tential United States rebalancing toward Asia? – as well as addressing the second part of the aim 
of the thesis – to discuss what implications it has for Europe, the following can be concluded: 
the outcome for European security can be described as a paradox. As the United States is having 
a wider focus and risks overstretching its resources, the need for Europe to take care of itself has 
increased. At the same time, the need for European support to and from the United States in-
creases as part of burden sharing. This realization means that Europe, if providing support to the 
United States, increases its bargaining position vis-à-vis the United States; therefore it can rely 
even more upon it. But at the same time, the United States does not want an overly strong or 
powerful Europe since it still would like to counterbalance all powers on the Eurasian continent. 
So if addressed properly, the historically increased American focus on Asia is potentially a win-
ning situation for European security.   
 
Before concluding with how general the finding and methods used are, a few comments will be 
made on how Europe can address this issue both with declaratory statements and with imple-
mented actions. An example of a declaratory policy can be the Norwegian way of addressing and 
supporting United States engagement in Asia,
170
 while examples of implemented actions can be 
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to focus more on strengthen the national defense within Europe, to participate in more global 
commitments or if financially possible, a combination of the two. Such a combination can be 
seen in Norway as the country focuses on both  national and regional issues as well as partici-
pates in global commitments such as in Syria and in the Pacific.
171
       
 
4.3 Overall conclusion – fulfilling the aim of the research   
The aim of this thesis was to examine and discuss the historical and current pretexts of to what 
degree the United States is rebalancing toward Asia and to discuss which implications it has for 
Europe. Based on the method used, indicators studied and demarcations made, the conclusion is 
that during the time period studied, the United States has always paid attention to the Pacific 
Command. Within the declaratory polices studied, no degree of rebalancing toward the Pacific 
Command can be identified, but rather the opposite can be noticed within the implemented ac-
tions studied. The degree of rebalancing was high from 1985 to 2005, and today it is just main-
tained with no concrete evidence supporting a restarted rebalancing since 2011.  
 
Despite this, the attention given to the European Command has decreased. The implications for 
Europe can be summarized as a paradox. As the United States is having a wider focus and risks 
overstretching its resources, the need for Europe to take care of itself has increased. At the same 
time, the need for European support to and from the United States increases as part of the burden 
sharing. This realization means that Europe, if providing support to the United States, increases 
its bargaining position vis-à-vis the United States and therefore can rely even more upon it. But 
at the same time, the United States does not want an overly strong or powerful Europe since it 
still would like to counterbalance all powers on the Eurasian continent. If addressed properly, the 
historically increased American focus on Asia is potentially a winning situation for European 
security.    
 
With the results presented, how general are they and can they be applied within other research? 
The question will be discussed in two ways, first with the outcome of the study and second, with 
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the method used. The outcome of the study can be used within the general debate of United 
States’ focus from the Second World War to the present within the political and military power 
systems, but it cannot be generalized to other power systems or other nations. Maybe the atten-
tion given by the United States to the two power systems studied can explain other nations’ be-
haviors, both friendly and adversarial. An example of this could be the increased focus by Nor-
way within the Pacific Command and the discussion within NATO described in the general in-
troduction.  
 
The discussion above underlines the need for continuous discussion and scientific research relat-
ed to not only those countries that are possible threats but also to neutral and allied countries. 
Such measures minimize the risk of misunderstandings, such as was addressed by scientist Dan-
iel Byman in his article Friends Like These: Counterinsurgency and the War on Terrorism.
172
 
However, it must be done in a manner that does not result in negative consequences.  
 
Regarding the method developed for this study, both the theoretical and the mixed method usage 
with emphasis on the statistical data provide results that can be of general use in further studies 
within this academic field. In this thesis, this method showed both a high level of validity as well 
as reliability. The outcome is based upon the comprehensive approach of studying both the de-
claratory polices and the implemented actions, with a combination of statistical data put in con-
text and discussed with qualitative data, remarks and comments.            
 
To end this thesis, a few citations will be used in order to reflect upon the method and data used 
that led to the results, including a reflection of the author’s own ability to draw conclusions. The 
citations stresses the need for analyzing long time periods for mitigating the risk of drawing con-
clusions on the most recent “hype”. The citations also stress the need for continuously studying 
and understanding the relevance of geopolitics when the politics of the United States is analyzed. 
The last citations reflect upon our ability to see or willingness to see and understand changes.   
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First, a citation by Ronald Regan who partly quoted Walter Lippmann: 
  
... the behavior of nations over a long period of time is the most reliable, though 
not the only index of their national interest. For though their interests are not eter-
nal, they are remarkable persistent ... There is no great mystery why this should 
be: the facts of geography are permanent ... thus successive generations of men 
tend to face the same recurrent problem and to react to them in more or less habit-
ual ways.[continuing by Reagan commenting] Lippmann’s observation is particu-
larly apt. While it is commonplace to hear that U.S. National Security Strategy 
changes erratically every four to eight years as a result of a new Administration 
taking office, in reality there is a remarkable consistency over time when our poli-
cies are viewed in historical perspective. The core interests and objectives of this 
Nation have changed little since World War II.
173
    
 
Ending the thesis by leaving the reader to reflect upon the results of the findings: 
 
Simply put, President Obama and I continue to believe that, Europe is the cornerstone of 
our engagement with the rest of the world and is the catalyst for our global cooperation. 
It’s that basic. Nothing has changed.174 
Joe Biden, Vice President, Munich 2013  
  
or  
 
There are over two thousand years of experience to tell us that the only thing harder than 
getting a new idea into the military mind is to get an old one out.
175
 
      Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart. 
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Annex A Matrix for commonality when categorizing data 
The following common principles, in alphabetically order, have been applied during the collec-
tion and categorizing of data. The list is not complete, instead it shall be seen as how different 
issues occurring while categorizing has been handled.   
 
Object Categorized  Comment 
Agreements   
 Generally Within the combatant com-
mand where it was signed. 
If not obviously incorrect as the 
peace agreements regarding Bos-
nia in the 1990s; categorized 
within the European Command  
 START The European Command The Anti-Ballistic Missile De-
fense Agreement (ABM) has not 
been counted. If added the num-
ber for the European Command 
would have increased even more.   
Alliance/ Organization   
 ANZUS The Pacific Command  
 ASEAN The Pacific Command  
 AU The African Command  
 EU The European Command  
 IMF Not categorized   
 NATO The European Command  
 OAS The Southern Command  
 OSSE The European Command  
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Object Categorized  Comment 
 WHO Not categorized   
Cities According to the city location 
within each Combat Command 
 
 
Events According to where the event 
occurs 
i.e The Cuban missiles crisis = 
Southern Command. 
i.e Battle of the Coral Sea = Pa-
cific Command 
i.e Battle in Tora Bora= Central 
Command 
if referred to as The Battle of the 
Coral Sea to Tora Bora = Central 
and Pacific Command 
Geographical areas   
 Hemispheric 
neighbours 
The Southern Command If not obviously including also 
nations direct neighbouring the 
U.S. Then also added to the 
Northern Command 
 Middle East The Central Command  
 Southwest 
Asia 
The Central Command If not obviously referring to areas 
within other combatant com-
mands 
 Western 
Hemisphere 
The Southern Command  
Nations According to the nation loca- Bermuda: Within its combatant 
  Page 107 
(134) 
   
 
 
   
 
 
Object Categorized  Comment 
tion within each Combat 
Command 
command localization.  
 
Former Soviet Union = European 
Command 
 
NIS = New Independent States, 
categorized as European and 
Central Command as the new 
nations referred to are located 
within bot Commands 
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Annex B Acronyms and Abbreviations  
This annex contains acronyms and abbreviations commonly used throughout the thesis in alpha-
betical order 
  
AFRICOM The United States African Command  
CENTCOM The United States Central Command 
DoD The United States Department of Defense  
EUCOM The United States European Command 
N/A Not applicable  
NATO The North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
NORTHCOM The United States Northern Command 
PACOM The United States Pacific Command 
SOUTHCOM The United States Southern Command 
U.S. The United States of America 
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Annex C Figures   
This annex contains a list of all figures presented in order of appearance  
Figure Name Page 
A The natural seas of power, Mackinder 1904 12 
B Overall research design 21 
C The World with combatant commanders’ areas of responsibility 23 
D Inaugural addresses. Total number of times nations, cities, agreements or alli-
ances have been mentioned categorized into each combatant command 1945 – 
2013, excluding NORTHCOM 
27 
E Inaugural addresses: In per cent the number of times nations, cities, agree-
ments or alliances have been mentioned categorized into each combatant 
command 1945 – 2013, excluding NORTHCOM 
28 
F State of the Union addresses: Total number of times nations, cities, agree-
ments or alliances have been mentioned each year 1947-2014, categorized 
into each combatant command 1947 – 2014, excluding NORTHCOM. 
31 
G State of the Union Addresses. In percent the number of times nations, cities, 
agreements or alliances have been mentioned each year 1947-2014, catego-
rized into each Combat Command, excluding NORTHCOM. 
32 
H National Security Strategies. Number of times nations, cities, agreements or 
alliances have been mentioned each year, 1948-2010, categorized into each 
combatant command 
35 
I National Security Strategies. The number of times nations, cities, agreements 
or alliances have been mentioned each year, 1948-2010, in percentage form 
and categorized into each combatant command  
36 
J Number of Security Council decisions known and found 1946-2014 39 
K Presidential Directives: Total number of times nations, cities, agreements or 
alliances have been mentioned categorized into each combatant command 
1947 – 2014 
40 
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Figure Name Page 
L Presidential Directives. In percent, the number of times nations, cities, agree-
ments or alliances have been mentioned categorized into each combatant 
command 1947 – 2014. 
40 
M Presidential Directives. Total number of times nations, cities, agreements or 
alliances have been mentioned, categorized into EUCOM, PACOM or classi-
fied categories, 1947 – 2014 
41 
N Presidential Directives. In percent, the number of times nations, cities, agree-
ments or alliances have been mentioned, categorized into EUCOM, PACOM 
or classified, 1947 – 2014 
41 
O Travels: The number of times a U.S. President has made a visit within each 
combatant command from 1945 – May 1, 2014. 
50 
P Travels: In percentages, the number of times a U.S. President has made a visit 
within each combatant command from 1945 – May 1, 2014. 
51 
Q Visits: The number of times foreign leaders has visited the United States, cat-
egorized by originating combatant command from 1945 to May 1, 2014 
52 
R Visits: In percentages, the number of times foreign leaders have visited the 
United States, categorized by originating combatant command from 1945 to 
May 1, 2014 
52 
S Travels – The number of times a U.S. Secretary of State has visited and area 
within each combatant command from 1945 to May 5, 2014. 
53 
T Travels: In percentages, the number of times a U.S. Secretary of State has 
visited an area within each combatant command from 1945 to May 5, 2014. 
53 
U Statistics of travels and incoming visits for elected and re-elected Presidents 
1945-2014 
55/56 
V Number of deployed military personnel 1950 – 2013, without compensation 
for overseas commitments 
 
58 
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Figure Name Page 
W Number of deployed military personnel 1950 – 2013, with compensations for 
overseas commitments 
58 
X In percent, number of deployed military personnel 1950 – 2013, without com-
pensations for overseas 
59 
Y In percent, number of deployed military personnel 1950 – 2013, with compen-
sations for overseas commitments 
59 
Z U.S. Navy ships/submarines homeport’s per Combat Command 63 
AA Number of officially-claimed United States military sites from FY 1980 – FY 
2013. 
68 
BB Total major military installations in the continental United States, 1957 – 
1978 
70 
CC Total major military installations in United States’ territories and in foreign 
countries, 1957 – 1974 
70 
DD The number of installations/sites per combatant command 71 
EE In percent, a comparison per combatant command of installations/sites 71 
FF The total amount of owned or rented acres FY 1980-FY2013 73 
GG Total amount of owned or leased acres per combatant command 74 
HH In percentage form, amount of owned or leased acres per combat command  74 
II Amounts in thousands of United States Dollars authorized for military con-
struction per combatant command 
76 
JJ In percentages, the authorized budget in US dollars for military construction 
per combatant command 
77 
KK United States Nuclear Stockpile 1945-2014 79 
LL The number of United States nuclear weapons in EUCOM, 1954 to 2011 81 
MM Atlantic Deployment On Shore 1961 – 1977 81 
NN Number of nuclear weapons within the Pacific Command ashore 82 
OO United States Nuclear Weapons in South Korea 1950 to 2000 83 
PP United States Nuclear deployments as sea 1961 to 1977 84 
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